Order On Board

21.11.2022 With the consent of counsel for the parties, the matter is heard finally.

1. By way of this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the order dated

11.07.2022 passed by Additional District Judge (FTC), Surajpur in Civil Suit No.50-A/2011 whereby the application under Order 1 Rule 10 (2) r/w Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC; application under Order 7 Rule 14 of CPC; and application under Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC, have been dismissed.

2. Shri Anurag Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner/plaintiffs submits that the plaintiffs had filed the civil suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction and respondent/defendant No.2 by taking advantage of the fact that plaintiffs are minor recorded his name in the revenue record. Subsequently, the defendant No.2 executed the sale deed of the property though no consideration was paid. Thereafter, defendant No.2 had sold the suit property to defendant No.1 on 09.09.2004. Further, defendant No.1 has alienated the suit property to defendants No.4 & 5 by way of sale deed dated 03.03.2011. It is further submitted that during the pendency of the suit, defendants No.4 & 5 had alienated the suit property to the proposed defendants namely Sharda Goyal and Sushida Devi, defendants No.6 & 7 respectively, on 13.10.2017 and on the suit land, they have installed the petrol pump which is managed by its partners Lalit Kumar Goyal and Bajrang Agrawal. Counsel further submits that considering the subsequent development, the petitioners/plaintiffs had moved the aforesaid applications to implead the subsequent purchasers, as also the application for amendment along with the necessary documents of subsequent sale and installation of the petrol pump on the suit land, which have been dismissed by the impugned order.

3. Further, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance in the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Mumbai International Airport (P) Ltd. Vs. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels (P) Ltd. reported in (2010) 7 SCC 417 and submits that the plaintiff in a suit being dominus litis, may choose the persons against whom he wishes to litigate. Therefore, considering all these aspects, the applications may be allowed and the impugned order may be quashed.

4. On the other hand, Shri Sinha, learned counsel for respondent/defendant No.2 would oppose the submission made by counsel for the petitioners and submits that Section 52 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 itself provides for doctrine of lis pendens and even the second subsequent purchaser has given their declaration that they are bound by the decree which has been ultimately passed in the suit so, just to delay the trial, the plaintiff had moved the aforesaid applications. Therefore, trial Court has rightly rejected the same.

5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents and orders annexed with the petition.

6. In Mumbai International Airport (P) Ltd (Supra) it has been specifically held that the general rule in regard to impleadment of the parties is that the plaintiff in a suit, being dominus litis, may choose the persons against whom he wishes to litigate. It is further held that a “proper party” is a party who, though not a necessary party, is a person whose presence would enable the court to completely, effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters in dispute in the suit, though he need not be a person in favour of or against whom the decree is to be made. Therefore, considering that the proposed defendants have purchased the suit property during the pendency of the suit and also permitted the other proposed defendants for installation of petrol pump, though, they are not a ‘necessary party’ but are ‘proper party’ and for a complete and effective adjudication, the plaintiff himself chooses to be a party, and further considering the principles of dominus litis, this Court is of the view that while rejecting the aforesaid applications the approach adopted by the trial Court is not sus