HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
CHIMABAI SHAHAJIRAO WADIKAR – Appellant
Versus
BASWANT GOPAL JADHAV AND ORS – Respondent
WP 1882/2012
['DESHMUKH SACHIN S', 'SABNIS AMEYA N', '', '', 'MORAMPALLE SANDIPAN N', 'S N MORAMPALLE', 'A N SABNIS']
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD.
WRIT PETITION NO.1882 OF 2012
Chimabai Shahajirao Wadikar.
.. PETITIONER.
VERSUS
Baswant Gopal Jadhav and ors.
.. RESPONDENTS.
...
Shri Sachin S. Deshmukh, Advocate for Petitioner.
Shri S.N. Morampalle, Advocate for R.No.1.
Shri A.N. Sabnis, Advocate for R.Nos.2 to 4.
...
CORAM : S.S. SHINDE, J.
11th June, 2013.
PER COURT:
1.
This writ petition has been directed against the
order passed by the Court below thereby condoning
delay of 284 days caused in filing appeal. It is
submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner
that incorrect facts were stated in the application for
condonation of delay and the appellate Court
accepted those incorrect facts and entertained the
prayer for condonation of delay and condoned the
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delay. He invited my attention to the pleadings in the
petition, grounds taken therein and submitted that
the delay was not properly explained by the
respondent No.1. Therefore, he submits that petition
deserves to be allowed.
2.
The learned Counsel appearing for the
respondents No.2 to 4 has adopted the submissions
made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner and
submitted that the inordinate delay should not have
been condoned by the appellate Court.
3.
On the other hand, learned Counsel for the
respondent No.1, relying upon the reasons recorded
by the appellate Court, submits that respondent No.1
is original plaintiff and he has not gained any undue
advantage by delaying filing of appeal.
4.
In the case of
Collector, Land
Acquisition Anantnag Vs. Ms. Katiji and ors.
Reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353, in paragraph 3,
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the Apex Court observed:
“3
The legislature has conferred the
power to condone delay by enacting S. 5 of
the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order
to enable the Courts to do substantial
justice to parties by disposing of matters
on ‘merits’. The expression “sufficient
cause” employed by the legislature is
adequately elastic to enable the Courts to
apply the law in a meaningful manner which
subserves the ends of justice that being
the life purpose for the existence of the
institution of Courts. It is common
knowledge that this Court has been making
a justifiably liberal approach in mattes
instituted in this Court. But the message
does not appear to have percolated down to
all the other Courts in the hierarchy.
And such a liberal approach is adopted on
principle as it is realized that:-
(1)
Ordinarily a litigant does not stand
to benefit by lodging an appeal late;
(2)
Refusing to condone delay can result
in meritorious matter being thrown out at
the very threshold and cause of justice
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being defeated. As against this, when
delay is condoned the highest that can
happen is that cause would be decided on
merits after hearing the parties.
(3)
“Every day’s delay must be
explained” does not mean that a
pedantic approach should be made. Why not
every hours delay, every seconds delay?
The doctrine must be applied in a
rational common sense pragmatic manner.
(4)
When
substantial
justice
and
technical considerations are pitted
against each other, cause of substantial
justice deserves to be preferred for the
other side cannot claim to have vested
right in injustice being done because of
a non deliberate delay.
(5)
There was no presumption that delay
is occasioned deliberately, or on account
culpable negligence, or on account of
mala fides. A litigant does not stand to
benefit by resorting to delay in fact he
runs a serious risk.
(6)
It must be grasp that judiciary is
respected not on account of its power to
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legalize injustice on technical grounds
but because it is capable of removing
injustice and is expected to do so.”