A lease for a manufacturing purpose under Section 106(1) of the Transfer of Property Act must be terminated by a six-month notice, but the validity of a notice terminating a lease can be challenged if the tenant raises an objection in their reply to the notice or in their written statement.

ORAL JUDGMENT :

1.Heard both the sides on the point of admission.

2. The appellant is the original defendant impugning the concurrent findings of the two Courts below whereby a landlord’s suit for possession on termination of lease has been decreed and the decree has been confirmed.

3. The learned advocate Mr. Vaidya for the appellant vehemently submits that there is no legal termination of the tenancy within the four corners of the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Since admittedly the premises was leased out for carrying out business of a saw mill, it was implied and therefore imperative for the Courts below to draw an inference that the lease was for a manufacturing purpose. Had such conclusion be drawn, certainly, in the absence of any written document of lease, by virtue of the sub Section (1) of Section 106, the lease ought to have been determinable by a statutory notice of six months, whereas, the notice in the matter in hand determining the lease only gives a 15 days time and therefore the lease has not been legally and validly terminated.

4. The learned advocate Mr. Vaidya referring to the unreported judgment of the Karnataka High Court in the matter of Mr. T.R. Krishna Gowda s/o Late Range Gowda since deceased by his L.Rs. Vs. Smt. Shashi Singh Dabi in Regular First Appeal No. 581/2009 dated 26.03.2013, submits that in similar set of facts that Court had taken a view that the lease was not validly terminated. By referring to the decisions of the Supreme Court in the matter of Idandas Vs. Anant Ramchandra Phadke (died ) by L.Rs.; (1982) 1 Supreme Court Cases 27 and Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar and another; (2000) 5 Supreme Court Cases 346 he would further submit that running a saw mill ought to have been treated as a manufacturing process. Both the Courts below have not specifically addressed all these vital points and have decreed the suit. A substantial question of law, as to whether the lease has been validly terminated in the facts and circumstances of the case arises for determination at the hands of this Court.

5. Learned advocate Mr. Bajaj for the respondent No. 1 would submit that admittedly there was no written lease. The fact that the lease was on monthly basis that was asserted in the notice under Section 106 was neither controverted in the reply to that notice, which was, even otherwise, not exhibited in the trial court, nor was any such plea raised in the written statement. He would submit that same is the case with the purpose for which the suit premises was leased out. Though it is the stand of the respondent No. 1 that it was leased out for business of running a saw mill, the fact that the business that was contemplated between the parties involved a manufacturing process was also not specifically asserted either in the reply to the notice or in the written statement. In the absence of such specific and precise pleadings even the trial court had not framed any such issue touching these aspects. He would further point out that though some arguments were advanced on these lines before the trial court, at no point of time any specific issue in that respect was sought to be framed and decided.

6. Lastly, Mr. Bajaj would submit that the decisions cited on behalf of the appellant particularly that of the Karnataka High Court is clearly distinguishable on facts in as much as a specific pleading to that effect denying the validity of the notice under Section 106 was raised in that matter which is conspicuously absent in the matter in hand. He would, therefore, submit that since there are concurrent findings of facts of the two Courts below, this Court should not cause any interference in exercise of the powers under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

7. There is no dispute about the facts that the suit premises was leased out for the business purpose of running a saw mill. Admittedly, there was no document creating the lease. By the notice under Section 1