HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
JAYARAM NAIDU – Appellant
Versus
VASANTHAKUMARI – Respondent
SA 1251/1996
['M/S R GURURAJ', '', 'D BASKAR', 'MANJULA BASKAR', 'M/S R SUBRAMANIAN', '', 'P RAJENDRAN', 'RR TO AND NDW', 'R JAYARAM NAIDU', 'R HEMAMPUJAM', 'R MINOR MURALI', 'R MINOR SAMPATH']
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Reserved On:25.01.2017
Pronounced On:13.02.2017
CORAM
THE HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE G. JAYACHANDRAN
SECOND APPEAL No.1251 of 1996
Jayaram Naidu
.. Appellant
/versus/
1.Vasanthi Kumari
2.Arumugam
3.Ramalingam
4.Anjalai Ammal
5.Jayaram Naidu
6.Sarangapani Naidu
7.Hemampujam
8.Latha
9.Ravi
10.Minor Murali
11.Minor Sampath
(Minor respondents 10 and 11
represented by guardian mother
the 7th respondent Hemampujam)
12.Lakshmi
..Respondents
Prayer:
Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure
Code against the judgment and decree dated 11.10.1995 in A.S.No.5 of
2
1993, on the file of the District Judge, South Arcot affirming the judgment
and decree dated 16.09.1992 in O.S.No.338 of 1989 on the file of the
District Munsif, Cuddalore.
For Appellant
:Mr.R.Gururaj
For Respondents :Mrs.A.Nilaphar for
Mr.R.Subramanian for R1
R2,3,4,6,8,9 and 12-NDW
R7,10,11- No appearance
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J U D G M E N T
The appellant herein is the first defendant in the suit, who lost
before both the Courts below. The suit was laid for declaration of title,
recovery of possession and mesne profits on the premise that, the
plaintiff's mother and the first defendant are daughter and son of Gopal
Naidu. On the eve of the marriage of the plaintiff with the first defendant,
the suit properties were settled in favour of the plaintiff on 24.06.1970 by
Gopal Naidu as prenuptial settlement. Thereafter, the marriage was
solemnised on 15.07.1970. After few years of marriage, misunderstanding
surfaced between the plaintiff and the first defendant resulting in their
separation. The first defendant continued to manage the suit properties
and her status as wife of the first defendant never ceased though a
document purported to be deed of revocation of settlement deed was
obtained from her by fraudulent means and the same does not bind her.
3
Other defendants are persons claiming themselves as purchasers or
intending purchasers of the suit properties from the first defendant.
Therefore, they are arrayed as defendants.
2. The defendants contested the suit on the premise that the
settlement deed executed by Gopal Naidu on 14.06.1970 is not a valid
settlement. The properties are the ancestral properties of Gopal Naidu.
Even if the settlement is valid, the bequest under the settlement was
jointly for the plaintiff, first defendant and their children. The plaintiff
never lived with the first defendant and the children born to the plaintiff
was not through the first defendant. They were born for one Veeraiyan,
with whom the plaintiff had illegal intimacy. The settlement deed was
never accepted or acted upon. In the panchayat held at the village, the
plaintiff released her rights under the settlement deed and also a deed of
divorce was executed on 24.08.1976. Since then the first defendant
enjoying the suit properties absolutely and had alienated several of the
suit items to third parties and also had entered into agreements for sale
with few others, who are arrayed as defendants. The alleged marriage
with the plaintiff itself is not valid, since both of them fall within the
prohibited relationship of consanguinity.
4
3. The trial Court held in favour of the plaintiff and allowed the suit
and the same was confirmed by the first appellate Court in the appeal filed
by the first defendant. Aggrieved by the concurrent finding, the second
appeal is preferred by the first defendant.
4. At the time of admission this Court has formulated the following
Substantial Question of Law for consideration:
“Whether the admitted possession of the defendant
in respect of the suit property under a document releasing
the plaintiff's right, though not registered, will prima facie
show the adverse interest against her by the person in
possession of the property?”
5. The learned counsel appering for the appellant straneously
submitted that