IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

Civil Review No. 33 of 2021

Sangita Ray (Bhattacharjee)

--- --- Petitioner

Versus

1.The State of Jharkhand

2.The Secretary, Human Resources Dept., Govt. of Jharkhand, Ranchi

3.The Director, Secondary Education, Govt. of Jharkhand, Ranchi

4.The District Education Officer, East Singhbhum, Jamshedpur

5.The Secretary, Shyama Prasad High School, Jamshedpur

6.The Head Master, Shyama Prasad High School, Jamshedpur

--- --- Respondents

…....

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN

For the Petitioner : M/s Afaque Ahmad, D.C. Shukla

& Awadhesh Pandey, Advocate

For the Respondents : Mr. Ashok Kumar Yadav, Sr. S.C.-I &

Rituraj, A.C to Sr.S.C-I

05/26.09.2022

Heard learned counsel for the parties.

2.

31.03.2009 is the date of the order of dismissal impugned in the

writ petition [W.P.(S) No. 2055 of 2009] whereby the writ petitioner/

review petitioner was dismissed from the post of Assistant Teacher in

Shyama Prasad High School, Khas Mahal, Jamshedpur in a departmental

proceeding on the basis of the charge-sheet dated 18.11.2008 based on

the complaint petition dated 26.09.2008 signed by 13 staff members of

the High School addressed to the Head Master, one of the respondent.

The learned Writ Court vide order dated 24.08.2016, without interfering

in the findings of the disciplinary authority on merits found the

punishment to be shocking to the conscience of the Court and

accordingly, after quashing the order of dismissal, remitted the matter to

the disciplinary authority to decide afresh on the quantum of

punishment. The Respondent Secretary and Head Master of the School

went in appeal. The learned appellate Court vide judgment dated

20.02.2020 passed in L.P.A. No. 495 of 2016 discussed the grounds

raised by the appellant and came to a finding that the order of the learned

Single Judge could not be sustained in the eye of law. The writ petitioner

had not moved the appellate Court against the judgment passed by the

first court though the Writ Court had not rendered any finding on the

disciplinary inquiry as such.

3.

The narrow ground on which the review petition has been

preferred by the writ petitioner is that in the impugned judgment passed

in L.P.A. No. 495 of 2016, the appellate court has used the expression

-2-

<termination= which has a different connotation and would make a huge

difference as to the nature of punishment imposed upon the writ

petitioner. Punishment of dismissal from service entails disqualification

from future employment or other stigma also, whereas termination

simplicitor does not entail any such stigmatic removal.

4.

We have perused the impugned judgment. We find that the appeal

was decided on the correctness of the judgment of the Writ Court where

the order of dismissal dated 31.03.2009 passed against the writ petitioner

was under challenge. However, the learned appellate Court at some

places has used the expression <termination= interchangeably with

<dismissal= or sometimes synonymous with that. This may be on

account of flourish of the pen but in the ultimate analysis it does not

make any difference to the final outcome of the appeal since what was

decided was a challenge to the order of dismissal. The dismissal order

remains intact and consequences flowing therefrom would obviously

follow. The use of expression <termination= at different places in the

impugned judgment would not make a difference to the adjudication by

the Appellate Court. As such, we do not find any grounds to review the

impugned judgment.

5.

The review petition is accordingly dismissed.

(Aparesh Kumar Singh, J.)

(Deepak Roshan, J.)

A.Mohanty