The right to continue defamation proceedings is not confined to the original complainant and can be extended to other individuals, including relatives, under certain circumstances.

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The question raised in this revision is whether the restriction contained in Section 199 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short, “the Code”) on the right of a person to prefer a complaint is applicable to the person who came forward to continue the proceedings on the death of the original complainant. Learned counsel for the revision petitioners contended that the person willing to continue the proceedings after the death of the original complainant should himself be a 'person aggrieved' while according to the learned counsel for respondent, the ban under Section 199 of the Code is applicable only in the matter of taking cognisance.

2. Though the general rule is that any person whether himself aggrieved or not by the offending act could make a complaint with a view to take action under the Code, Chapter XIV of the Code imposes conditions in the matter of 'taking cognizance' of certain offences. Section 199 of the Code which relates to prosecution for defamation states that “no court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Chapter XXI of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence”. The proviso states that where such person is disabled from preferring a complaint for the reasons sated in the proviso, some other person may, with the leave of the court, make a complaint on his or her behalf. In this case, complaint for the offence punishable under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, “the Penal Code”) was preferred by the person allegedly defamed. Learned magistrate took cognizance of the offence and initiated proceedings against revision petitioners. While the case was pending, complainant died. Respondent came forward willing to continue the proceedings and filed Crl.M.P. No.988 of 2001 to implead herself in the compliant. Despite objection raised by revision petitioners, learned magistrate as per the impugned order allowed the prayer. According to learned counsel for revision petitioners, respondent is not a “person aggrieved” by the imputations and as such the order of impleadment is bad in law. Learned counsel submitted that the alleged defamatory statement concerned the performance of the deceased complainant as a paid Secretary of a Mahal committee and as such respondent who is his niece cannot be termed as a person aggrieved and entitled to continue the proceedings after the death of the complainant. Learned counsel placed reliance on the decisions of this Court in Mathew v. Balan (1984 KLT 893) and Nazeem Bavakunju v. State & others (1987 (2) KLT 755). Counsel for respondent in support of his contention that the restriction contained in Sec.199 of the Code is only in the matter of taking cognizance, placed reliance on the decision of this Court in C.M. Stephen v. John Manjooran (1970 KLT 545).

3. Section 199 of the Code uses the words “some person aggrieved”. So far as the words “some person aggrieved” are concerned, there cannot be inflexible rule that those words limit the right to make a complaint for the offence of defamation to the person actually defamed. The words in Sec.199(1) of the Code cannot be understood as having the narrow meaning that none other than the person defamed could prefer a complaint. Whether a person is aggrieved by the imputations depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. For instance, if an imputation of immorality is attributed to a girl, the reputation of her father would also be at stake and hence, the father of the girl concerned can also be said to be a “person aggrieved”. The object of incorporating the words “some person aggrieved” is only to limit the right to file complaint for the offence of defamation to the person who suffered the injury.

4. The question for consideration and decision is whether such restriction is applicable to a person who comes forward willing to continue the proceedings on the death of the complainant at whose instance cognizance of the