For a tenant to claim protection under Sec. 11 (3) of the Act, they must substantiate dependency on rental income and show lack of alternative premises, which they failed to do.

ORDER

K.HARILAL, J.

Revision petitioner is the tenant who is confronting with an order of eviction passed against him under Sec.11 (3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act ('the Act' for short). The petitioners/landlords filed four Rent Control Petitions against different tenants who are occupying four shop rooms of the petitioners. Altogether there are five shop rooms in the building. The revision petitioners herein are the respondents/tenants in RCP 24/2008. The parties are referred to as in the Rent Control Petition. According to the petitioners, the fourth petitioner who is working as Manager of Catholic Syrian Bank, Puthiyakam branch will retire on superannuation on 31.8.2009 and after his retirement he wants to start a supermarket in the entire building. According to them, they have no other vacant shop rooms in their possession to conduct the supermarket. Thus, they filed four Rent Control Petitions against four tenants who are occupying building bearing door Nos 181 to 184.

2. The respondents/tenants resisted the claim for eviction under Sec.11 (3) of the Act raising a common contention that the need projected in the petition is a ruse for eviction only. It is also contended that they are entitled to get protection under the second proviso to Sec.11 (3) of the Act as they are mainly depending upon the income which is being derived from the business in the petition schedule shop rooms and no other vacant buildings are available in the locality to shift their business.

3. After considering the evidence on record, the Rent Control Court allowed all the Rent Control Petitions on a finding that the need projected in the petition is bona fide and the tenants are not entitled to get protection under the second proviso to Sec.11 (3) of the Act. Among the four tenants, two tenants preferred appeal before the appellate authority and the respondent is one among them. After re-appreciating the evidence on record, the appellate authority also confirmed the findings of the Rent Control Court except the findings under the second limb of the second proviso. However, the appellate authority also confirmed the order of eviction under Sec.11 (3)

of the Act.

4. Heard the learned counsel for the respondent.

5. Though this revision has been filed on various grounds challenging the concurrent findings of the court below, the learned counsel for the respondent mainly focused his argument on the findings under the bona fides and the second limb of second proviso to Sec.11 (3) of the Act. The learned counsel submits that the petition schedule building was not suitable for conducting the business and there is no other material or evidence which would prove that the fourth petitioner will start the said business after his retirement.

6. Going by the concurrent findings of the courts below, it is seen that in order to prove the bona fides of the need the fourth petitioner for whose need the petition schedule shop rooms were required, was examined as PW1. PW1 has testified the bona fides of the need. In other words, he has testified his mental state expounding his intention to start the business and offered himself for cross-examination. The courts below concurrently observed that even though he was cross- examined at length, nothing has been brought out in evidence to doubt the bona fides of his need. No evidence was adduced to prove that the tenanted premises are not suitable for conducting supermarket. Being a revision this Court is not inclined to re-appreciate the evidence of PW1, particularly when the courts below concurrently placed reliance on his evidence. The respondent has no case that the courts below have omitted to consider any valuable evidence or placed reliance on any irrelevant evidence or wrong position of law.

7. That apart, it is seen that the respondents raised a contention that non-production of the material to prove the age of the fourth petitioner is fatal. But the appellate authority has meticulously considered the