The petitioner, a Private Limited Company, claims to haveengaged itself in real-estate. About a few items of property allegedlyowned and possessed by it, the respondent authorities began proceedingsunder the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 (“theAct”).

2. First, the authorities issued the Ext.P1 show-cause notice under

Section 24 of the Act. The petitioner replied, putting forward its defence.

Later, the 2nd respondnet, the authority concerned, passed the Ext.P2-3-order; it rejected the petitioner's defence. Then to have the matter furtherprocessed, the same authority passed the Ext.P3 order, provisionallyattaching the properties. The order seems to have been passed underSection 24 (4)(b) of the Act. Later, through the Ext.P4, the 2^nd

respondent placed the matter before the 3^rd respondent, who is theadjudicating authority. Under those circumstances, the petitioner hasfiled this writ petition, seeking these reliefs:

“i)call for the records leading to Exhibits P1 (series ofnotices), P2 and P3 (series of orders), P4 (reference order) issuedby the 2^nd respondent and quash the same by the issuance of awrit of certiorari or such other writ, order or direction.

ii)Issue an order restraining the respondents from initiatingor continuing with any proceedings for confiscation of propertieswhich are the subject matter of Exhibits P1 (series of notices), P2and P3 (series of orders), P4 (reference order), issued under theprovisions of “The Prohibit of Benami Property TransactionsAct, 1988.iii)declare that the provisions of “The Prohibition of BenamiProperty Transaction Act, 1988' providing for confiscation ofproperties found to be held 'benami' cannot be applied in respectof transactions entered into prior to 1.11.2016.”

3. From the above extract, I reckon that the petitioner haschallenged all proceedings the respondent authorities have initiated: the

Ext.P1 show cause notice, the Ext.P2 order of rejection, the Ext.P3 order-4-of provisional attachment, and also the Ext.P4 order of reference.

Indeed, Ext.P3 is the order capable of execution or enforcement. Theother orders only aid the process. So it is the Ext.P3 that needs thejudicial interference, if ever. But as the writ petition seems to becomprehensive in its challenging the very initiation of Benamiproceedings, I adjudicate the merits of the writ petition.

4. Sri M. Gopikrishnan Nambiar, the learned counsel for thepetitioner Company has strenuously contended that the provisionalattachment is with no statutory backing. According to him, Section 5,which speaks of confiscation, suffered an amendment on 01.11.2016. Soany property acquired before 01.11.2016 must not be subjected to anyscrutiny under the Act. In other words, be it provisional attachment orthe possible eventual-confiscation, both fall foul of Section 5.

5. On the other hand, Sri Jayasankar V. Nair, the learned CentralGovernment Counsel, has submitted that the writ petition is premature.

According to him, the provisional attachment is an interim arrangement,only to preserve the property until the authorities completed theproceedings under the Act. He has also submitted that the petitioner can-5-appear before the 3^rd respondent, put forward its defence, and establishthat the Company, indeed, owns the property and that proeprty cannot betainted with the label Benami. Eventually, the learned CentralGovernment Counsel has submitted that Section 5 has no application tothe proceedings.

6. Heard Sri M. Gopikrishnan Nambiar, the learned counsel for thepetitioner, and Sri Jayasnakr V. Nair, the learned Central GovernmentCounsel for the respondents.

7. Indeed, the facts are not in dispute, and the issue lies in a narrowcompass. The petitioner’s counsel has frontally attacked the procedurethe authorities have adopted in passing the impugned order: the Ext.P3order of provisional attachment. According to him,