Condonation of delay is not a right; parties must act diligently, and the court has discretion to refuse delay applications if sufficient reasons aren’t shown.

The present Appeal, under Section ­­­51(1) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 (for short “the Act”) has been filed by the Appellant against the order dated 07.11.2016 of the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Bangalore, Karnataka (for short “the State Commission”) in Complaint No.131 of 2013 whereby the Complaint of the Respondent was allowed.

2. Since the present Appeal has been filed with a delay of about four years, an application IA No.7246 of 2020 has also been filed. Arguments on this application for condonation of delay are heard.

IA 7246 of 2020 (condonation of delay)

3. Vide this application, the Appellant has sought condonation of delay of four years in filing the present Appeal. It is contended that the Appellant had no knowledge of the passing of the impugned order since during the pendency of the Complaint before the State Commission it had changed the address and therefore, copy of final order was not received by it. Secondly, the Counsel for the Appellant did not inform it that the matter had been reserved for order on 13.07.2016 and the order was pronounced on 07.11.2016, copy of which was not received by it. It learnt of the passing of the impugned order only as its property was attached in the execution proceedings. On these grounds, the condonation of delay in filing the present Appeal has been sought.

4. Admittedly, the Appellant had been served with the notice of the Complaint and had participated in the trial. When the case was fixed for final arguments, repeated adjournments were sought on behalf of the Appellant. Finally, the State Commission after giving final opportunity to the Appellant to argue the matter reserved the matter for order on 13.07.2016. Thereafter, the final order was pronounced on 07.11.2016. The argument is that during the pendency of the Complaint before the State Commission, the Appellant/Opposite Party had changed its address and therefore, they never received copy of the impugned order. On enquiry, learned Counsel for the Appellant admits that the change of address was not brought to the notice of the State Commission or to the Complainant. Neither any application for bringing on record the changed address of the Opposite Party/Appellant was ever filed nor any oral submission to this effect was made before the State Commission. It is the bounded duty of the parties to bring to the notice of the Commission the correct facts and inform them of the changes in its status which occurs during the pendency of the Complaint. Therefore, when the Appellant had changed its address during the pendency of the Complaint, it was its boundened duty to bring on record the changed address. By not doing so, it is the Appellant who had acted negligently and carelessly and now he cannot be permitted to take advantage of its own wrong by arguing that it had never received copy of the impugned order. The Commission in discharge of its statutory duty is required to send free copies of the order to the parties at the address on record. The Appellant, therefore, cannot be allowed to take advantage of its own wrong at this stage for seeking condonation of delay on this ground.

5. Another argument of learned Counsel for the Appellant is that the Appellant was never informed by its Counsel that the matter had been reserved for order and that he had not argued the matter before the State Commission. It is expected from all the clients/parties in a case to act diligen