ORDER

1.       This revision petition has been filed in challenge to the Order dated 03.07.2023 in Appeal No. 320 of 2018 of the State Commission Kerala arising out of Order dated 10.10.2017 of the District Commission in Complaint no. 173 of 2015.

2.       Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and have perused the record including inter alia the Order dated 10.10.2017 of the District Commission, the impugned Order dated 03.07.2023 of the State Commission, the application for condonation of delay in filing the petition and the memo. of petition.

3.       The present petition has been filed with reported delay of 153 days.

4.       As the delay does not appear to be insignificant, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners is being heard first on the delay condonation application in order to decide whether there is any good ground to condone the delay or not. 

5.       The submissions made by the learned counsel are no different from the grounds taken in the delay condonation application and they have been virtually repeated once again.  

Submission is that there was a change in the administration of the petitioner firm and a different administrator came to be appointed in place of the earlier one.  The new administrator was unaware about the pending cases and so while he was in the process of preparation of annual report it came to know about the impugned Order that had been passed on 03.07.2023.  Subsequently, the certified copy was applied and procured.  The records were sent to the counsel and it took some time to prepare the draft and subsequently the petition was filed with delay which was not deliberate or intentional and, therefore, deserved to be condoned.

6.       It may be observed that in the ordinary course the advisable approach to be adopted in such matters by a judicial or quasi-judicial Forum as the case may be, is to lean favourably towards the defaulting petitioner who fails to file the petition within the limitation period.  It is ordinarily preferred not to adopt a pedantic approach but to proceed with a pragmatic view and to decide the case on merits rather than to thwart the cause at the very threshold on the ground of limitation.  But while saying so Commission should not be understood to mean or to imply that the law of limitation wherever it is provided by the Act can either be blissfully ignored or be soft paddled at will.  Such kind of approach will entirety frustrate and defeat the very purpose which inspires the enactment of the law of limitation.  The statutory law regarding limitation, wherever it is provided has a salutary purpose to serve, and has to be respected and complied with.  In no case can any forum judicial or quasi-judicial can ride roughshod on the solemn provisions regarding the law which provides limitation period.  It goes without saying that when a particular order attains finality it simultaneously gives rise to a right to the other side and unless there is sufficient cause, which may justify the condonation of delay and satisfy the given Fora looking into the matter that there were actually justifiable reasons which go to explain as to why the petition was not filed within the stipulated period of time, the Forum cannot act either whimsically or capriciously. The judicial discretion which even this Commission exercises in the matters of condonation of delay is not an exercise of some kind of privilege or prerogative, it is a judicial discretion and has to be exercised judiciously.  The availability of sufficient cause has to be seen in perspective of the conspicuous facts and circumstances of each case and the onus of showing such factual basis from which may emanate the convincing grounds to vindicate the delayed filing has to be discharged by the petitioner who seeks judicial indulgence in this regard.  It is true that while evaluating the sufficiency of cause with regard to the circumstances, which resulted in the delay in filing the present petition, the Bench