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ITEM NO.4 COURT NO.6 SECTION IV-B

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) Diary No(s). 17812/2019

(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 07-12-2018

in FAO No. 7387/2018 passed by the High Court Of Punjab & Haryana

At Chandigarh)

NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA & ANR. Petitioner(s)

VERSUS

SUBHASH BINDLISH & ORS. Respondent(s)

(IA No. 92898/2019 - CONDONATION OF DELAY IN FILING

IA No. 92899/2019 - PERMISSION TO FILE ADDITIONAL

DOCUMENTS/FACTS/ANNEXURES)

Date : 14-08-2019 These matters were called on for hearing today.

CORAM :

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE UDAY UMESH LALIT

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VINEET SARAN

For Petitioner(s)

Mr. Ravi Bharuka, Adv

Mr. Sunny Kadiyan, Adv.

Mr. Sarvshree, Adv.

Mr. Justine George, Adv.

Mr. Aditya Singhal, Adv.

Mr. Devashish Bharuka, AOR

For Respondent(s)

UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following

O R D E R

Delay condoned.

Heard Mr. Devashish Bharuka, learned counsel for the

petitioners.

In the present case, the application for setting aside

the arbitral award was preferred beyond 120 days and as such the

Courts below found that there was a specific bar under Section

34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Reliance was

Digitally signed by

INDU MARWAH

Date: 2019.08.19

11:33:20 IST

Reason:

Signature Not Verified

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also placed on the decision of this Court in Directorate of

Enforcement vs. Ashok Kr. Jain reported in (1998) 2 SCC 105.

According to Mr. Bharuka, as a result of amendment effected in

the year 2015, sub-section 2 of Section 36 which dealing with

Enforcement now stands amended. Thus, the earlier regime available

under Section 36, to a certain extent, has been diluted and it is

his submission that the relaxation of the regime under Section 36

must have some reflection on the term “but not thereafter” as

appearing in Section 34 (3) of the Act.

In our considered view, both these provisions stand on

different footings. What is provided under Section 34(3) is the

outer limit within which the application can be preferred for

setting aside the arbitral award. The law laid down on the point

by this Court is very clear and in our view the subsequent

amendement in 2015 would not change the character of the mandate

under Section 34(3) of the Act.

We, therefore, see no reason to interfere in the matter. The

special leave petition is dismissed.

Pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.

(INDU MARWAH) (SUMAN JAIN)

COURT MASTER BRANCH OFFICER