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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5614 OF 2009

(Arising out of SLP(C) No. 2703 of 2008)

Vijay Narayan Thatte & Ors.

....

Appellants

Versus

State of Maharashtra & Ors.

....

Respondents

O R D E R

1.

Heard Shri Harish Salve and Shri Shyam Divan,

learned senior counsel for the appellants and learned

Attorney General of India and Shri Shekhar Naphade, learned

learned senior counsel for the respondents.

2.

Leave granted.

3.

This appeal has been filed against the impugned

judgment and order dated 21.01.2008 passed by a Division

Bench of the High Court of Bombay whereby the writ petition

filed by the appellants herein has been rejected.

4.

The facts in brief are that a Notification under

Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter for

short 'the Act') was issued in respect of the land in

question on 29.8.2002. Thereafter a Notification under

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Section 6 of the Act was issued on 18.6.2003. The said

Notification under Section 6 was challenged and the writ

petition filed by the appellants was allowed on 20.1.2004

and the Notification under Section 6 of the Act dated

18.06.2003 was quashed. Subsequently a second Notification

under Section 6 dated 30.10.2006 was issued by the State

Government.

5.

The short question that arises for consideration is

whether the Notification under Section 6 dated 30.10.2006 is

valid. In our opinion, the said Notification was clearly

barred by clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 6 of the Act

which reads as under :-

“[Provided that no declaration in respect of any

particular land covered by a notification under

section 4, sub-section (1),-

(i)

........ ......... .......

(ii)

published after the commencement of the

Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be

made after the expiry of one year from the date

of the publication of the notification;”

It can be seen from the aforesaid proviso to Section 6 that

it is couched in negative language. It is well settled that

when a Statute is couched in negative language it is

ordinarily regarded as peremptory and mandatory in nature.

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[See Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P.

Singh 11^th Edition, 2008 pages 390 to 392]. As stated by

Crawford “Prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever,

be directory. And this is so even though the statute

provides no penalty for disobedience.” [See Crawford :

Statutory Construction P. 523; See also in this connection

Haridwar Singh Vs. Begum Sumbra, AIR 1972 SC 1242 (1247),

Lachmi Narain Vs. Union of India AIR 1976 SC 714 (726),

Mannalal Khetan Vs. Kedarnath Khetan AIR 1977 SC 536 etc.]

6.

In this connection we may also refer to the Mimansa

Rules of Interpretation, which were our traditional

principles of interpretation for over 2500 years, but which

are unfortunately ignored in our Courts of law today.

7.

It is deeply regrettable that in our Courts of law

lawyers quote Maxwell and Craies but nobody refers to the

Mimansa Principles of Interpretation. Most lawyers would not

have even heard of their existence. Today our so-called

educated people are largely ignorant about the great

intellectual achievements of our ancestors and the

intellectual treasury which they have bequeathed us. The

Mimansa Principles of Interpretation is part of that great

intellectual treasury, but it is distressing to note that

apart from the reference to these principles in the judgment

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of Sir John Edge, the then Chief Justice of Allahabad High

Court in Beni Prasad vs. Hardai Bibi 1892 ILR 14 All 67

(FB), a hundred years ago and in some judgments of one of us

(M. Katju, J.) there has been almost no utilization of these

principles even in our own country. Most of the Mimansa

Principles are rational and scientific and can