SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
SINNI BAI – Appellant
Versus
HITSHARAN – Respondent
C.A. No.-004013-004014 / 2010
06-04-2021
PRATIBHA JAINSHIV SAGAR TIWARI
1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 4013-4014 OF 2010
SINNIBAI & ORS. APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
HITSHARAN RESPONDENT(S)
O R D E R
The present appeals arise from the order dated
07.05.2009 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh
dismissing the defendants Second Appeal arising out of an
Eviction Suit.
The Trial Court decreed the Eviction Suit on
finding that the appellants-defendants had created nuisance
in terms of Section 12(1)(c) of the Madhya Pradesh
(Accommodation and Control) Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred
to as the “Act”). The first appeal preferred by the
appellant also stood dismissed.
Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that
no nuisance had been created. The appellants were in
possession under a valid lease. No unauthorised
constructions had been raised on the Platform in front of
the Shop. The construction of the tin shed was with
Municipal approval, to the knowledge of the respondent.
Denying that any encroachment had been made, it was
Digitally signed by
Rajni Mukhi
Date: 2021.04.09
16:26:43 IST
Reason:
Signature Not Verified
2
submitted that if the wooden platform placed over the
municipal drain adjacent to the Platform was considered an
obstruction, the appellants are willing to remove it. It
was a purely temporary arrangement and was removed
immediately after shop hours. It was specifically denied
that any inconvenience had been caused to the respondent-
plaintiff by reason of the customers coming to the shop of
the appellants. It was lastly submitted that the First
Appellate Court did not concur with the findings of the
Trial Court regarding the tin Shed only and not on the
issue of encroachment.
Learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that the
lease agreement dated 1.10.1979 was for a period of five
months only. The Platform was not to be used as shop
premises but was to be utilized by way of passage only.
The appellants could not raise any construction on the
Platform without the consent of the respondent. In this
regard, he relied upon the findings of the First Appellate
Court that the tin shed had been constructed on the
Platform without the consent of the respondent and the
municipal authorities. It was lastly submitted that the
lease deed provided that in case of violation of any
condition, the landlord would have the right to get the
shop premises vacated.
3
We have considered the submissions on behalf of the
parties and deem it appropriate to set out Section 12(1)
(c) of the Act which reads as follows:
“...that the tenant or any person residing with him
has created a nuisance or has done any act which is
inconsistent with the purpose for which he was
admitted to the tenancy of the accommodation, or
which is likely to affect adversely and
substantially the interest of the landlord therein.
Provided that the use by a tenant of a portion of
the accommodation as his office shall not be deemed
to be an act inconsistent with the purpose for which
he was admitted to the tenancy.”
The issue No. 3 framed by the Trial Court was as
follows:
“Whether the defendant has caused obstruction and
hindrance by putting up goods of the shop on the
public road and passage to the courtyard of the
plaintiff.”
The Trial Court after consideration of the evidence
concluded that the tin shed had been put up on the Platform
which was to be used as passage. The defendants-appellants
were obliged under the lease not to create any obstruction in
the passage to the courtyard. The placing of goods by the
appellants in the courtyard, shrinking the road by putting up
wooden platform over the drain and using the same to keep
weights and measures, bala