Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2681 OF 2011

[Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 5488 of 2011]

Narayan Chandra Ghosh

—

Appellant (s)

VERSUS

UCO Bank & Ors.

—

Respondent (s)

O R D E R

1.

Leave granted.

2.

This appeal by the borrower is directed against judgment dated 7^th

December, 2010 delivered by the High Court of Calcutta in C.O.

No.3608 of 2009. By the impugned judgment, the High Court has set

aside the order passed by the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal,

Kolkata (for short, “the Appellate Tribunal”) in Appeal No.35 of

2009, whereby the Appellate Tribunal, while allowing the application

filed by the appellant under Section 18(1) of the Securitisation and

Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security

Interest Act, 2002 (for short, “the Act”) had exempted the appellant

from making any deposit in terms of second proviso to Section 18 of

the Act before entertaining the appeal against the order passed by the

Debts Recovery Tribunal.

3.

With the consent of learned counsel for the appellant as also the

respondent-bank, which is on caveat, we have heard the matter finally

at the motion hearing stage itself. Since the issue canvassed before us

is a pure question of law, we deem it unnecessary to state the facts

giving rise to this appeal.

4.

Assailing the judgment, Mr. Ranjan Mukherjee has submitted that

since the Debts Recovery Tribunal had not entertained the appeal

preferred by the appellant under Section 17 of the Act on a technical

ground and the quantum of amount due from the appellant had not

been determined, the Appellate Tribunal could not saddle the

appellant with any liability of pre-deposit under Section 18 of the Act.

It is thus, asserted that the Appellate Tribunal was justified in

entertaining the appeal without insisting on any deposit in terms of

Section 18 of the Act.

5.

Per contra, learned counsel for the bank, while supporting the

judgment of the High Court has submitted that the Appellate Tribunal

2

had failed to appreciate that the deposit of an amount in terms of

Section 18 of the Act is a condition precedent for entertainment of the

appeal. According to the learned counsel, the language of Section

18(1) of the Act being clear and unambiguous, the order passed by the

Appellate Tribunal was clearly unsustainable.

6.

Thus, the short question for consideration is whether the Appellate

Tribunal has the jurisdiction to exempt the person, preferring an

appeal under Section 18 of the Act from making any pre-deposit in

terms of the said provision?

7.

Section 18, which provides for appeal to the Appellate Tribunal, reads

as under:

“18. Appeal to Appellate Tribunal.—(1) Any person

aggrieved, by any order made by the Debts Recovery

Tribunal under section 17, may prefer an appeal along with

such fee, as may be prescribed to an Appellate Tribunal

within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order of

Debts Recovery Tribunal.

Provided that different fees may be prescribed for filing an

appeal by the borrower or by the person other than the

borrower:

Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained unless

the borrower has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal fifty

per cent of the amount of debt due from him, as claimed by

the secured creditors or determined by the Debts Recovery

Tribunal, whichever is less:

3

Provided also that the Appellate Tribunal may, for the

reasons to be recorded in writing, reduce the amount to not

less than twenty-five per cent of debt referred to in the

second proviso.

(2)

.....

…..

…..

…..

…..

…..

…..

….

…”

8.

Section 18(1) of the Act confers a statutory right on a person

aggrieved by any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under

Section 17 of the Act to prefer an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal.

However, the right conferred under Section 18(1) is subject to the

condition laid