IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10327 OF 2011 MUNISHAMAPPA APPELLANT(S) VERSUS M.RAMA REDDY & ORS. RESPONDENT(S)
SHAILESH MADIYALVAIJAYANTHI GIRISH
ORDER
1. This appeal assails the correctness of the judgment and order dated 10.11.2010, passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore, whereby the Second Appeal preferred by the defendant-respondent was allowed, and the suit for specific performance of contract filed by the appellant was dismissed. 2. On 28.05.1990, the appellant and the respondents entered into an agreement to sell, in which the property in question was to be sold for Rs. 23,000/-, and the entire sale consideration was paid before the execution of the Agreement to Sell, and possession of the property in question was also handed over to the appellant. It was also agreed that from the time of execution of the Agreement to Sell, the respondents would have no rights left and it would be the appellant who would have all the rights over the property in question. However, due to the prohibition on registration of the sale deed, it was Digitally signed by SONIA BHASIN Date: 2023.11.11 12:37:48 IST Reason:
- Signature Not Verified stipulated that the sale deed would be executed once this restriction was lifted. The Agreement to Sell dated 28.05.1990 contained all the above facts duly incorporated therein. The prohibition on the sale was due to bar contained in Section 5 of the Karnataka Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the “Fragmentation Act”). 3. Even at the time of the execution of the Agreement to Sell, there was a serious likelihood of the Fragmentation Act being repealed. Soon thereafter i.e. on 05.02.1991, the Fragmentation Act stood repealed. Thereafter, the appellant claims to have repeatedly requested the respondents to execute the sale deed, which was merely a formality since the entire sale consideration had already been paid by the appellant, and they had taken the possession of the property in question, which they continued to hold. Despite the same, the respondents continued to delay the execution of the sale deed. Ultimately, the appellant sent a legal notice to the respondents on 03.09.2001, according to which the respondents had finally refused to register the sale deed on 28.08.2001. 4. When the sale deed was not executed despite the notice, the appellant instituted the suit for specific performance on 01.10.2001. In response, the respondent filed written statement denying the execution of the Agreement to Sell. Both parties led oral as well as documentary evidence. However, the Trial Court vide judgment dated 28.09.2004 dismissed the suit. The Trial Court primarily based its decision on the finding that the execution of the Agreement to Sell was doubtful. It also held that the suit was filed beyond the period of limitation. 5. The Regular First Appeal, preferred by the appellant, was allowed vide judgement dated 14.01.2008. The First Appellate Court held that the suit was within the limitation period, and the appellant had proved the execution of the Agreement to Sell. There was no inconsistency in the evidence of appellant’s witnesses (PW1-PW3). The respondent no.1, who was examined as DW1, admitted during the cross-examination that he had executed the Agreement to Sell and had put his signatures thereon. On such findings, the First Appeal was allowed, and the suit was decreed. 6. The respondents preferred Second Appeal before the High Court, which came to be allowed by the impugned judgment dated 10.11.2010, only on the finding that the Agreement to Sell was in violation of the Fragmentation Act, and therefore void. It is the said judgment of the High Court which is assailed in the present appeal. 7. Judgment of the Trial Court clearly reveals that the following issues were framed: 1. Whether the plaintiffs prove that the