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2025 MarsdenLR 711
HIGH COURT MALAYA SHAH ALAM
GAN PEI LING – Appellant
Versus
YONG MEE LEE & ORS – Respondent
[Civil Appeal No: BA-12B-109-10/2024]
The court established that in defamation cases, the defendant must prove the truth of the main sting of the libel, and the burden of proof may shift based on the evidence presented.
Headnote:(A) Defamation Act 1957 - The court addressed the principles of defamation, specifically the burden of proof on the defendant to establish the truth of the imputations. The court reiterated that the test for defamation is whether the words are capable of bearing a defamatory meaning as judged by a reasonable person. (Paras 13, 14, 15, 18, 19)
(B) Justification - The defendant must prove the truth of the main sting of the libel rather than every detail. The court emphasized that the burden of proof shifts depending on the evidence presented. (Paras 20, 22, 43)
(C) Aggravated Damages - The court directed a reevaluation of whether aggravated damages were justified based on the correct legal principles. (Paras 3, 4)
Facts of the case:
The plaintiffs claimed defamation by the defendant through Facebook posts, which led to the original judgment awarding damages. The High Court set aside this judgment, addressing the issues of defamatory meaning, justification, and qualified privilege.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the defamatory imputations were substantially true and allowed the appeals, setting aside the previous judgment.
Issues: The main issues included the truth of the defamatory imputations, the applicability of qualified privilege, and the justification for awarding aggravated damages.
Ratio Decidendi: The court concluded that the imputations were defamatory and that the defendant failed to prove their truth, thereby allowing the appeals.
Result: Appeals allowed with costs.
Introduction
[1] This appeal originated from two consolidated suits at the Sessions Court by the Respondents who were 2 sets of Plaintiffs in No BA-B53F-4-02/2020 ("Suit 4") and Suit No BA-B53F-15-08/2019 ("Suit 15") respectively. The Plaintiffs had claimed that the Appellant/Defendant defamed them in the same series of Facebook posts.
[2] As a brief procedural background, Suits 4 and 15 were tried before the Sessions Court Judge who allowed the Plaintiffs' claims on 31 October 2022, gave various injunctive relief and ordered the Defendant to pay RM50,000.00 as general damages, RM50,000.00 as aggravated damages and RM50,000.00 as exemplary damages with costs of RM20,000.00 to the Plaintiffs.
[3] On the Defendant's appeal to the High Court, the Judgment of the Sessions Court was set aside on 20 July 2023. The High Court decided certain issues on that appeal, namely:
(a) that the claim by the 2nd Plaintiff in Suit 4 (namely the Society, sued through its officer) was dismissed with costs;
(b) no exemplary damages may be awarded
and remitted the case to the Sessions Court for reconsideration based on the following instructions:
(a) On the pleaded defamatory meanings/imputations were defamatory
The test of whether or not the published words are defamatory is the test of a hypothetical reasonable man
(b) On the defence of justification
For a defence of justification to succeed, the Defendant only need to prove the truth of main sting of the libel or gist of the libel as pleaded by the Plaintiff, rather than the exact words used. If the sting of the libel is justified, then immaterial allegations cannot be grounds for finding against the Defendant
(c) On the defence of qualified privilege
The trial judge is to reconsider and analyse the evidence before coming to a decision whether on facts the Defendant was entitled to succeed on the defence of qualified privilege
(d) On whether aggravated damages were correctly awarded The trial judge is to reconsider the evidence and make factual findings in accordance with the correct legal principles onaggravated damages before coming to a decision whether or not aggravated damages should be awarded over and above the general damages here
[4] Based on the instructions, it may be inferred that the pleaded defence of fair comment had been rejected by the High Court. There was no appeal to the Court of Appeal against that earlier High Court decision.
Preliminary Issue
[5] On 30 September 2024, the Sessions Court Judge gave a fresh Judgment that excluded the award of exemplary damages, but was otherwise identical to the Judgment given on 31 October 2022. The Sessions Court Judge declined to re-consider the matter, reiterated her findings and orders of 31 October 2022 and regarded the Court to be functus officio.
[6] A re-trial was not ordered when the case was remitted by the High Court for re-consideration by the Sessions Court with its audio-visual advantage intact having tried the case. However, the Sessions Court Judge was clearly wrong to rule that the Court was functus officio. Both counsels agreed that this appeal should now be decided based on the records of appeal.
[7] There was also a helpful concession by counsel at the hearing of the appeal that the impugned Facebook posts were capable of bearing the imputations assigned to them as pleaded, by their natural and ordinary meaning or by way of innuendo (collectively, "Imputations"):
Suit 4
(Natural and ordinary meaning)
a) PI adalah kclua agama sesat dan atau knllus (cull leader),
b) PI telah inenggalak dan mempengaruh golongan muda meninggalkan pekerjaan mereka demi berkhidmat untuk kctua agama sesat dan atau kultus;
c) PI telah menyebabkan putusnya hubungan kckeluargaan di antara GPC dan D dengan ibu bapanya (family breakers);
d) PI telah mengganggu dan menzalimi D dan ibu bapanya dalam usaha mengekalkan GPC sebagai "buruh percuma";
e) PI telah membuli, menzalim dan menganeam untuk memukul D;
f) PI telah mengamalkan tabiat buli siber
