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2025 MarsdenLR 160

HIGH COURT MALAYA JOHOR BAHRU
LOW KOK GUAN @ LOW KOK GUAN – Appellant
Versus
CHEAH CHIA HSING – Respondent
[Suit No: JA-22NCVC-70-05/2021]



Petitioner Advocates:Ong Kow Meng,Raw Kim Hwa ,Respondent Advocate: G Nanda Goban,Tan Chee Ying

A consent judgment precludes relitigation of settled issues, and defamation claims require proof of malice, which was not established.

Headnote:(A) Legal Profession Act 1976 - Section 17(1) - Defamation action - Counterclaim for abuse of process - Both claims dismissed due to res judicata stemming from a prior consent judgment (CJ) regarding a complaint to the Advocates and Solicitors Disciplinary Board (ADSB) - The court emphasized the principle that parties cannot relitigate issues settled by a final judgment. (Paras 27, 35, 43)

(B) Defamation - Elements of proof - The plaintiff failed to establish a defamation claim as the alleged defamatory statements were protected by qualified privilege - The court found no evidence of malice or improper purpose in the defendant's actions. (Paras 54, 60, 72)

(C) Abuse of Process - The counterclaim was dismissed due to lack of evidence supporting claims of improper purpose or mental distress caused by the plaintiff's actions. (Paras 84, 92, 100)

Facts of the case:
The plaintiff, a practicing lawyer, filed a defamation suit against a former pupil who had lodged a complaint against him with the ADSB. The defendant counterclaimed for abuse of process, alleging that the plaintiff's suit was initiated with improper motives. Preliminary issues raised included whether the claims were barred by res judicata due to a prior CJ.

Findings of Court:
The court found that the issues in both claims had been settled by the CJ, thus barring further litigation. The plaintiff's defamation claim failed due to the application of qualified privilege, and the counterclaim was dismissed for lack of evidence.

Issues: The main issues included the applicability of res judicata to both claims and whether the elements of defamation were satisfied.

Ratio Decidendi: The court ruled that the CJ precluded both parties from relitigating the matters previously settled and emphasized the necessity of proving malice in defamation claims, which was absent in this case.

Result: Both the plaintiff's claim and the defendant's counterclaim are dismissed, with parties ordered to bear their own costs.

JUDGMENT

Noor Hisham Ismail J:

Introduction

[1] This is a defamation action filed by the Plaintiff ("P") against the Defendant ("D") and a counter claim by D for tort of abuse of process against P.

[2] At the end of the trial, after having heard counsel for both parties, this Court had dismissed both the claim and counter claim with parties were ordered to bear their own costs.

[3] Parties have since filed their respective appeals to the Court of Appeal.

[4] Hence, this is the Court 's grounds of judgment for the said decision.

Salient Facts

[5] This matter originated at the Sessions Court but was transferred to this Court by consent of both parties on 10 May 2021.

[6] P was at the material time and still at present an advocate and solicitor of the High Court of Malaya, practicing in his own law firm in Johor Bahru, Johor.

[7] D was at the material time, one of P's pupils in his chambers. At present, D is also an advocate and solicitor practicing in a law firm somewhere in the Klang Valley.

[8] D started her pupillage with P on 3 January 2019. According to D, it was P's representation that he possesses extensive knowledge and skills in civil litigation that led D to apply to undergo her pupillage with P.

[9] Not long after, D claimed that P did not fulfill his role as a pupil-master as she was actually since end of April 2019 obtaining all the necessary training under the guidance and tutelage of another advocate and solicitor lawyer, one Mr R.

[10] It transpired that Mr R was often engaged by P's firm to act as counsel to conduct P's litigation cases. At the material time, Mr R was practicing in his own legal firm elsewhere, also in Johor Bahru.

[11] D further complaint about the type of work assigned to her by P which according to D were unrelated to legal work. Aggravating this further was P's action of also placing D under the supervision of one Mr D, a former lawyer that his name had been struck off from the Bar Council's roll of Advocates & Solicitors.

[12] Due to the said dissatisfaction, D had her pupillage changed from being under P to Mr R as her new pupil master starting from 8 May 2019. To that end, D had taken the necessary steps including filing of the relevant cause papers in her petition for admission as an advocate and solicitor.

[13] P, although consented to D's changed of master, but actually with reluctance.

[14] P had expressed such reluctance initially with a letter dated 30 May 2019 sent to D, a copy of which was extended to the Bar Council. Subsequently, P sent another letter dated 14 June 2009, but this time directly addressed to the Bar Council. The contents of both letters would appear in essence as P's complaints towards D pertaining to her pupilage.

[15] On 20 June 2019, D reacted by officially lodged a complaint with the Advocates and Solicitors Disciplinary Board ("ADSB"), a disciplinary body established under the Legal Profession Act 1976 , with allegations against P which form the subject matter of P's defamation action against D in the instant matter.

[16] Meanwhile, during the unfolding of the above events, D completed her pupilage on 11 October 2019 and her petition for admission was scheduled to be heard on 5 December 2019. On the other hand, at or about the same time, P received a written notice from the ASDB on 25 November 2019 seeking his explanation to D's complaint.

[17] D then decided to withdrew her complaint against P via letter addressed to the ADSB dated 25 November 2019 and the same was communicated to P as well. P was also informed of the same by the ADSB on 26 November 2019.

[18] While one may think that things could possibly de-escalate between parties since D withdrew her complaint against P, instead what happened was P decided to lodge a caveat against D's petition for admission as an advocate & solicitor High Court of Malaya ("petition") pursuant to s 17(1) Legal Profession Act 1976 at the Kuala Lumpur High Court ("caveat"). Naturally, D was unable to be admitted as an advocat


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