A party cannot seek equitable relief after affirming a judgment and benefiting from it, as it constitutes abuse of process and violates equitable principles.

Introduction

[1] This case is not merely about statutory compliance or procedural technicalities. It is about what the justice of the case demands and the finality of the litigation process. In this respect, the Court is duty- bound to protect its process from being abused. The Plaintiff's application is, in truth, an opportunistic attempt to overturn a concluded settlement by consent, which was long settled by mutual compromise. The real question before this Court is whether it should lend its hand in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction to a party who remained silent when it mattered, paid when it suited, and now pleads illegality when it no longer wishes to honour its compromise. This Court must answer that question firmly, and in doing so, defend the integrity of its process against abuse.

Background Facts

[2] The Plaintiff seeks to set aside a Judgment in Default ("JID") entered in 2018, contending that the Defendant had failed to obtain leave under s 471(1) of the Companies Act 2016 , as the Plaintiff was under a winding-up order when the suit was filed. Section 471 (1) provides:

" Section 471 (1) - When a winding up order has been made or an interim liquidator has been appointed, no action or proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced against the company except by leave of the Court and in accordance with such terms as the Court imposes."

[3] The Plaintiff further seeks restitution of RM560,000.00, alleging the sum was paid pursuant to a void judgment. In reality, the winding- up order had been terminated before judgment was entered, and the payments were made voluntarily and in acknowledgment of the debt; and the winding-up petition was later struck out at the Plaintiff's own behest.

Facts In Chronological Order

a) On 28 April 2018, the Plaintiff company was wound up by a creditor (not the Defendant).

b) On 31 July 2018, the Defendant filed Suit No AA-22NCVC-99-07/2018 against the Plaintiff. No leave was obtained under s 471(1) of the Companies Act 2016 . The Defendant was unaware at the time of filing the suit that the Plaintiff was under a winding-up order. The Defendant's solicitors had not been informed of the winding-up.

c) On 17 August 2018, the winding-up order against the Plaintiff was terminated.

d) On 12 September 2018, the Defendant obtained a Judgment in Default ("JID") against the Plaintiff. This occurred after the winding-up had already been terminated.

e) It was only later, during the enforcement stage, that the Defendant became aware of the Plaintiff's earlier winding-up. The issue of failure to obtain leave under s 471(1) was only raised by the Plaintiff after full enforcement efforts were in process. There is no evidence that the Defendant had knowledge of the winding-up status at the time of filing the suit or obtaining the JID. This is consistent with the Defendant's affidavits and submissions, which emphasised that although no leave was sought, the winding-up had ceased before the judgment was entered.

f) Between July 2018 (before the JID was obtained) and November 2019, the Plaintiff made cumulative payments totalling RM560,000.00 to the Defendant in partial satisfaction of the sum owing and/or JID.

g) On 14 May 2019, the Defendant filed a winding-up petition (No. AA-28NCC-45/2019) based on the JID.

h) In January 2020, the Plaintiff applied to strike out the Defendant's winding-up petition, this was done not on the basis that the JID was void, but solely on the ground that the amount claimed in the winding-up petition failed to reflect prior payments.

i) The petition was struck out on 22 Ju