Acknowledgment of debt resets the limitation period for solicitor's fees, affirming the SAR's decision on cost taxation.

Anselm Charles Fernandis JC:

Introduction

Background

[2] The amount stated in the BOC dated 5 June 2017 was RM4,855,000. The petitioner asserted that the amount claimed was "grotesque, capricious, unacceptable and wholly disproportionate to the work carried out by the respondent" as the appellant had already paid the respondent RM74,000 in fees. The appellants prayed that the BOC be referred to the SAR to be taxed under s 126 of the Legal Profession Act 1976 . The appellants contend that the correct and reasonable amount payable to the respondent would be RM349,300.

[3] On 20 September 2018 this court allowed the appellants' application for the BOC be taxed by the SAR. For ease of reference the relevant part of s 126 is reproduced here:

(1) An order for the taxation of a bill of costs delivered by any advocate and solicitor may be obtained by a petition as a matter of course by the party chargeable therewith, or by any person liable to pay the cost either to the party chargeable or to the advocate and solicitor, at any time within six months from the delivery of the bill, or, by the advocate and solicitor after the expiration of one calendar month, and within a year from, the delivery.

(2) The order shall contain such directions and conditions as the court thinks proper, and any party aggrieved by any order of court may apply by summons in chambers that the same may be amended or varied or set aside.

[4] On 18 March 2019, the learned SAR awarded the sum of RM400,000 as getting up cost and RM2,785 as out of pocket expense. The costs awarded was subject to a 4% allocator fee.

[5] Both the appellants and the respondent appealed against the decision of the SAR (see encl 60 and encl 61 respectively).

[6] The appeals were heard before this court on 27 June 2019. Both appeals were dismissed and this court affirmed the decision of the learned SAR. Not being satisfied with the decision of this court appellants appealed to the court of Appeal.

Brief History

[7] In order to show how this present proceeding came about I will start by giving a brief history of this case.

[8] The appellants held themselves out as the personal representatives of the estate of Ponnamal a/p Mookapillai ("Ponnamal"). They also claim to be the trustees of the will of Ponnamal. Ponnamal passed away on 25 November 1988.

[9] Sometime in 1980, Ponnamal entered into an agreement with one Nadarajah a/l Sithambaram Pillai ("Nadarajah") to buy a piece of land held under Grant No 12359 Lot 1631 Mukim Teluk Bharu in the State of Perak ("the land"). The purchase price was RM3,000,000. Nadarajah passed away sometime in August of 1982 after receiving RM420,000 as deposit under the agreement.

[10] A dispute arose between Ponnamal and Nadarajah's estate in respect of the transfer of the land to Ponnamal. The respondent was engaged by Ponnamal in 1984 to commence Originating Summons 267 of 1984 ("OS 267") against Nadarajah's estate seeking specific performance of the agreement. Whilst undertaking the proceedings, the respondent had succeeded in securing a judgment by way of a consent order dated 31 October 1985 for specific performance.

[11] Nadarajah's estate then commenced a separate suit at the Ipoh High court, namely Civil Suit 2087 ("CS2087") praying, inter alia to set aside the consent order and a declaration that the agreement was void and unenforceable as it was an illegal moneylending transaction. The two matters were consolidated and were heard together. The respondent represented Ponnamal and subsequently after her death the estate of Ponnamal in both these matters.

[12] On 18 January 2002, James Foong J (as he then was) ordered specific performance in respect of sale and purchase of the land against Nadarajah's estate. Nadarajah's estate appealed against the High court d