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2023 MarsdenLR 397

HIGH COURT MALAYA GEORGETOWN
GOH KEAN PENG – Appellant
Versus
FONG TAT YUAN & ORS – Respondent
[Civil Suit No: PA-22NCVC-28-02/2021]



Petitioner Advocates:Hee Ying Peng ,Respondent Advocate: Teh Ee Teng

A claim for slander requires defendants to be the speakers of the impugned words for liability, which was not established.

Headnote:Statute Analysis: Under O 18 r 19(1)(a), (b) and (d) of the Rules of Court 2012, the court considers striking out applications. Facts of the Case: The Plaintiff alleges slander by D1 but draws liability against D2, D3, and D4 Co without sufficient pleading.

Findings of Court:
The court finds no sufficient basis for vicarious liability.

Issues: The core issue is whether the Plaintiff's claim against D2, D3, and D4 Co is maintainable.

Ratio Decidendi: The court concludes the Plaintiff failed to establish sufficient grounds for D2, D3, and D4 Co's liability under slander as they did not utter the impugned words.

Result: The Plaintiff's claim for slander is dismissed against D2, D3, and D4 Co as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of court process.

Table of Content
1. claim for slander involves assessing whether the defendants spoke the impugned words. (Para 1 , 2 , 4 , 7)
2. elements of slander require proof of defamatory words referring to the plaintiff. (Para 8 , 11 , 12)
3. striking out applications require clear unsustainability of claims. (Para 9 , 10 , 20)
4. vicarious liability does not apply in slander where there is no active participation. (Para 22 , 24 , 27 , 29)
Kenneth St James JC:

(Application To Strike Out)

Prelusion

[1] The Plaintiff sues all four Defendants for slander. The allegedly slanderous words were spoken by the 1st Defendant (D1), but the Plaintiff pleads that the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Defendants (D2, D3 and D4 Co) were also liable for the words uttered.

[2] D2, D3 and D4 Co applied to strike out the Plaintiff's suit against them, under O 18 r 19(1)(a), (b) and (d) of the Rules Of 2012 ( ROC ). Should the Plaintiff's claim against D2, D3 and D4 Co be summarily struck out?

The Pertinent Pleaded Facts

[3] D4 Co is a company. The Plaintiff was the managing and executive director and shareholder of D4 Co And D1, D2 and D3 are individuals who are directors and shareholders of D4 Co

[4] The Plaintiff pleads that in D4 Co's board of directors' meeting on 11 January 2021, the Defendants suspended the Plaintiff from his duties as D4 Co's managing and executive director, for allegedly committing "serious misconducts".

[5] A Notice of suspension was given to the Plaintiff. The Notice was signed by D2.

[6] Later that same day, a D4 Co Heads of Department meeting was called. That meeting was attended by D1, D2 and D3, and all the other Heads of Department.

[7] The Plaintiff pleads that at that meeting, the Defendants, through D1, made slanderous statements against the Plaintiff. The relevant words of the allegedly slanderous statements are pleaded (the impugned words). The Plaintiff seeks certain reliefs and remedies for the alleged slander.

[8] At the hearing of the Application to strike out, I asked (counsel for) the Plaintiff a series of questions to establish some agreed facts. The answers given by the Plaintiff establish the fact that:

(1) the Plaintiff's sole cause of action in this suit is for slander;

(2) i t was D1 who spoke the impugned words. But the words were spoken in D2, D3 and D4 Co's presence. (The Plaintiff alleges that D2, D3 and D4 Co caused the impugned words to be spoken by D1. The Plaintiff also alleges that D2, D3 and D4 Co did not stop D1 from uttering the impugned words.);

(3) the Plaintiff did not plead that D2, D3 and D4 Co are vicariously liable for the impugned words spoken by D1.

The Law On Striking Out

[9] A review on the law on striking out is found in the Federal Court case of Tan Wei Hong (a minor suing through guardian ad litem and next friend Chuang Yin E) & Ors v. Malaysian Airlines Bhd & Other Appeals, [2019] 1 MLJ 59; [2018] AMR 529 (FC).

[10] Tan Wei Hong sets out that:

[16] The principle for striking out of pleadings pursuant to O 18 r 19 of the ROC is well settled. It is applicable only in a plain and obvious case or where a claim is, on the face of it, obviously unsustainable (see: Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v. United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd, (SC)...)

[17] The tests for a striking out application under O 18 r 19 of the ROC , as adopted by the Supreme Court in Bandar Builder are, inter alia, as follows: Tan Wei Hong & Ors v. Malaysia Airlines Berhad, [2019] 1 MLJ 59; [2018] AMR 529 (SC) at 68

(a) it is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should be had to the summary process under the rule;

(b) this summary procedure can only be adopted when it can be clearly seen that a claim or answer is on the face of it obviously unsustainable;

(c) it cannot be exercised by a minute examination of the documents and facts of the case in order to see whether the party has a cause of action or a defence;

(e) the Court must be satisfied that there is no reasonable cause of action or that the claims are frivolous or vexatious or that the defence

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