The prosecution must prove the identity of the drugs beyond reasonable doubt, and any doubts must favor the accused.

[7] At the end of the Prosecution's case, it is trite law that the Court is bound to apply a maximum evaluation of the Prosecution's evidence to determine whether the Prosecution has made out a prima facie case against the Accused. This exercise necessarily involves the Court in subjecting all the evidence of the Prosecution's witnesses to strict scrutiny. The credibility of the testimony of all the Prosecution witnesses must be scrutinised and evaluated with a fine toothcomb. Should more than one inference arise, the one favourable to the Accused must be adopted.

[8] This principle is clearly stated in the case of PP v. Mohd Radzi Abu Bakar , [2005] 6 MLJ 393 as follows:-

"[2] After the amendments to ss 173(f) and 180 of the CPC, the statutory test has been altered. What is required of a subordinate Court and the High Court under the amended sections is to call for the defence when it is satisfied that a prima facie case has been made out at the close of the prosecution case. This requires the Court to undertake a maximum evaluation of the prosecution evidence when deciding whether to call on the accused to enter upon his or her defence. It involves an assessment of the credibility of the witnesses called by the prosecution and the drawing of inferences admitted by the prosecution evidence. Thus, if the prosecution's evidence admits of two or more inferences, one of which is in the accused's favour, then it is the duty of the Court to draw the inference that is favourable to the accused.

...

[12]... Put shortly, what the trial Court is obliged to do under ss 173(f) and 180 of the CPC is to ask itself the question: If the accused elects to remain silent, as he is perfectly entitled to do, am I prepared to convict him on the evidence now before me? See, Dato' Mokhtar bin Hashim & Anor v. Public Prosecutor, [1983] 2 MLJ 232; [1983] CLJ (Rep) 101. If the answer to that question is in the affirmative, then the defence must be called. And if the accused remains silent, he must be convicted. If the answer is in the negative, then the accused must be acquitted. "

[9] Back to the case against the Accused, the elements that have to be proven by the prosecution is as follows:-

(i) The solid substance seized from the 4 tins in the 2 plastic bags carried by the Accused are dangerous drugs;

(ii) The drugs were in the custody and control of the Accused;

(iii) The Accused had trafficked the said drugs.

[10] In this case, the Chemist, PW3 has confirmed that the solid substance analysed by him is dangerous drugs. ie cocaine totaling 1541.80 grams and that cocaine is a dangerous drug as listed in the First Schedule as defined in s 2 of the DDA 1952. I have considered the evidence of PW3 and find no reason to disagree with the findings of PW3. The first element is therefore proven.

[11] As far as the second element is concerned, it is not in dispute that the Accused was in possession of the 2 bags with the words "Dubai Duty Free Alokozay" at the time of the arrest and therefore the element of custody and control is clearly proven. Further, the presumption under 37(d) comes to the aid of the prosecution to infer possession and knowledge on the part of the Accused. This presumption is of course rebuttable and the presumption in s 37(d) of the DDA 1952 can be rebutted from the evidence adduced by the prosecution. In Chee Chiew Heong v. Public Prosecutor , [1981] 2 MLJ 287; [1981] CLJ 122, the Court held that:-

"The presumption in s 37(d) that possession of the container in which the dangerous drug is found is deemed to be possession of the drug itself is a rebuttable one. In this case, the p