Introduction

[1] This is the First and Third Defendants' application to strike out the Plaintiffs' claim pursuant to O 18 r 19(a) to (d) of the Rules of 2012 ("ROC 2012") ("encl 11").

Brief Facts

[2] Briefly, the facts in the present case are as follows.

[3] The Second Plaintiff had entered into a sale and purchase agreement on 7 August 2004 with the previous registered proprietor of a piece of land held under GM 3474, Lot 4241, Mukim Sungkai, Daerah Batang Padang ("the said Land") ie Zon binti Idris who had passed away on 12 September 2005 ("the Deceased"). It was agreed that the said Land was to be transferred to the Second Plaintiff for a consideration of RM 40,000.00 in which RM 4,000.00 deposit had been paid by the Second Plaintiff to the Deceased ("the First Agreement"). After the Deceased's death the said Land was transferred to the Deceased's son ie the First Defendant.

[4] No action was taken by the Second Plaintiff to enforce the First Agreement until 8 July 2016 (ie almost 12 years later) where another agreement was entered into between the Second Plaintiff and the First Defendant regarding the sale and purchase of the said Land for a consideration of RM 94,000.00 in which RM 10,000 deposit had been paid by the Second Plaintiff to the First Defendant ("the Second Agreement").

[5] Later, it has come to the attention of the Plaintiffs that the First Defendant had entered into another sale and purchase agreement of the said Land with the Second Defendant on 2 December 2016.

[6] The Plaintiffs had, on 2 March 2018 filed an action against the Defendants, claiming for, inter alia, interlocutory injunction, specific performance and damages.

[7] On 27 June 2018, the First and Third Defendants filed this application which was heard before me.

Law

[8] First and foremost, O 18 r 19 of ROC 2012 provides that:

"(1) The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any pleading or the endorsement, of any writ in the action, or anything in any pleading or in the endorsement, on the ground that -

(a) it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence, as the case may be;

(b) it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious;

(c) it may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action; or

(d) it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court, and may order the action to be stayed or dismissed or judgment to be entered accordingly, as the case may be.

(2) No evidence shall be admissible on an application under subparagraph (1)(a).

(3) This rule shall, as far as applicable, apply to an originating summons as if it were a pleading."

[9] I am guided by the principles enunciated in the Supreme Court case of Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v. United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd, where it was held as follows:

"The principles upon which the Court acts in exercising its power under any of the four limbs of O 18 r 19(1) Rules of the High are well settled. It is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should be had to the summary process under this rule (per Lindley MR in Hubbuck v. Wilkinson [1899] 1 QB 86, p 91), and this summary procedure can only be adopted when it can be clearly seen that a claim or answer is on the face of it "obviously unsustainable" (Attorney- General of Duchy of Lancaster v. L & NW Ry Co [1892] 3 Ch 274, CA). It cannot be exercised by a minute examination of the documents and facts of the case, in order to see whether the party has a cause of action or a defence (Wenlock v. Moloney [1965] 1 WLR 1238; [1965] 2 All ER 871, CA.). The authorities further show that if there is a point of law which requires serious discuss