Judicial Review under the Immigration Act is restricted to procedural non-compliance, emphasizing the non-justiciable nature of State Authority decisions.

[1] On 28 September 2015 this court disallowed the Applicant's application for Judicial Review, with no order as to costs.

[2] Section 65 of the Immigration Act 1959/63 provides that the act or direction given to the 1st Respondent by the State Authority can only be questioned on ground of procedural non-compliance. The court is precluded from exercising its power of Judicial Review to examine the validity of the exercise of administrative powers conferred by the Act on substantive grounds/fairness (in this case alleged violation of fundamental liberties and any other reasons).

[3] The ouster clause in s 59A of the Immigration Act in clear and explicit terms provide that any act made by the State Authority is not subject to Judicial Review except on grounds of procedural non-compliance of the requirements of the Act. Pihak Berkuasa Negeri Sabah v. Sugumar Balakrishnan & Anor Appeal, [2002] 3 MLJ 72 (which is the landmark case in the special right of immigration by the State Authority of Sabah) reinforces the constitutional safeguards given to the States of Sabah and Sarawak in the formation of Malaysia. The issues/disputes of our present case had been clearly propounded by the said case. It is binding precedent still.

[4] I agree with learned SFC that the function of 1st Defendant is purely mechanical exercise. Further, as affirmed by Sugumar's case, in the exercise of the powers conferred by the State Authority under s 65 (1) of the Act, the State Authority was not required to give reasons. Further, I agree that any reasons given by the State Authority in court proceedings cannot be examined or taken into account.

[5] Section 67 of the Act does not confer absolute right on the Applicant to enter Sabah. It is conditional upon her discharging the burden of proof that her intended entry was for legitimate political activity, which burden she did not discharge in this case.

[6] Section 59 of the Act also does not provide that the State Authority requires the giving of an opportunity to be heard.

[7] On the Applicant's claim that her fundamental liberties had been infringed, the answer can be found in ss 66 & 67 of the Act which collectively point out that there is no absolute right for the Applicant to enter Sabah. Article 5 (1) of the Constitution provides that "no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty save in accordance with law". The Immigration Act which restricts citizens right of entry into Sabah and Sarawak is one such law. See PP v. Yee Kim Seng , [1983] 1 MLJ 252.

[8] Applicant had also relied on her claim of legitimate expectation to enter Sabah. Her legitimate expectation was predicated on her past visit to Sabah. I agree that her legitimate expectation did not fall within the category as discussed by Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service [1985] AC 374 and as applied in the court of Appeal case in Law Pang Ching & Ors v. Tawau Municipal Council, [2009] 3 MLJ 452.

[9] Finally, "art 9 (2) gives the citizen the right to move freely throughout Malaysia and to residue in any part thereof. However, these rights are subject to cl 3, which according to Andrew Hardings's Law, Government and the Constitution in Malaysia at p 225.

"clearly refers to Sabah and Sarawak, both of wh ich enjoy such a special position. The purpose of the qualification is to ensure that constitutional challenges cannot be brought against the States in respect of the use of their special immigration powers, which may be used to control entry from Peninsular Malaysia". See also Datuk Syed Kechik bin Syed Mohamad v. Government of Malaysia , [1979] 2 MLJ 101."- see Sugumar's case, supra, at p 139-140.

[10] It is thus very clear that by s 59A (1) of the Act, the decision of the State Authority is non-