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2019 MarsdenLR 752

HIGH COURT MALAYA JOHOR BAHRU
LINDA OTHMAN – Appellant
Versus
PEMBANGUNAN TANAH DAN PERUMAHAN SENDIRIAN BERHAD – Respondent
[Civil Suit No: JA-22NCVC-79-05/2018]



Petitioner Advocates:Rosli Kamaruddin,Muhammad Zahier Rosli ,Respondent Advocate: Omar Kutty Abdul Aziz,Amer Ashrhaf Azudin

The court acknowledged a beneficiary's standing to sue for land ownership despite absence of formal letters of administration, establishing principles of equity in fraudulent transactions.

Headnote:This judgment considers a Writ of Summons involving a beneficiary's claim over land ownership against the registered owner. The court finds evidence supports the existence of a Sale and Purchase Agreement despite its absence, reinforcing the Plaintiff's standing. The court outlined significant issues including locus standi and fraud. Ultimately, the court ruled in favor of the Plaintiff, determining compensation and declaring damages due to ongoing deprivation of land use. "I allowed the monetary damages to the sum of RM600,000.00 (Ringgit Malaysia Six Hundred Thousand only) to be calculated from 18 August 1973 for the following reasons:-"

Table of Content
1. court confirms existence of sale despite missing documents. (Para 15)

[13] In the present case the only issue that need to be addressed by the Court is whether the appellants, as the beneficiaries of the estate of the deceased have the locus standi to seek the declaratory relief as per prayer (c) of the claim. In our view the case on point is the case of Ooi Jim & Anor v. Ai Eit & Ors, [1977] 2 MLJ 105. In that case the first appellant had applied for a declaration that her husband was the lawful adopted son of Jaw Ing who had died intestate. The application was dismissed as it was held that she should first obtain letters of administration of her husband's estate. She then appealed to this Court. Allowing the appeal, this Court held that it was not necessary for the 1st appellant to take out letters of administration to bring the action which was primarily an action for a declaration as to the status of her husband. The Court stated that the question of taking out letters of administration would onlu arise when it became necessary for her to claim her share in the estate o f the intestate. No authority was cited by the Court in support of its decision. But the following cases seem to support the finding of this Court in Ooi Jim. First, the Singapore case of Omar Ali Bin Mohd & Ors v. Syed Jajaralsadeq Abdulkadir Alhadad & Ors [1995] 3 SLR 388, which was cited to us by learned counsel for the appellants. In that case the plaintiffs sought declarations that the unexpired residue of the leasehold interest of 999 years in a property vested in the estate of the father of the plaintiffs (the intestate) and that the purported sale of the property by the first four defendants (who are the trustees of the estate of the holder of the reversion to the property) to the fifth defendant, in so far as it included the leasehold interest of the intestate's estate, was null and void. The first four defendants applied for security for costs on the ground that the plaintiffs were ordinarily resident out of jurisdiction. They claimed, inter alia, that the plaintiffs had no legal authority whatsoever to institute the present action; no one had the legal authority to act on behalf of the estate of the intestate until he or she had applied to the Court for a grant of letters of administration. The learned assistant registrar allowed the application. Chao Hick Tin J, allowed the appeal by the plaintiffs holding, inter alia, that the plaintiffs were not suing oh behalf of the estate. They were suing in their own capacity as beneficiaries of the estate for a declaration to protect the property of the estate and to prevent the sale of the property to the fifth defendant from going through. This they had the locus standi to do as they had at least an equity in the estate of the intestate. In coming to his decision the learned judge adopted the view expressed by Gillard J in Re Atkinson [1971] VR 612, where Gillard J held that where there were competing claims then the trustee company was not bound to use its own fund to vindicate the testator's rights, if any. If it had obtained an indemnity from the beneficiaries, other considerations might well have applied. On the issue of whether the beneficiaries and, in particular, the son, would have the necessary standing to bring an action against the widow to vindicate the testator's interest. he expressed the view that the beneficiaries had at least 'an equity' to entitle him to seek on behalf of the estate in a Court of equity the remedy of a declaratory judgment; and 'an equity' means a right to a remedy in a Court of equity. Chao Hick Tin J then went on to say that: Of course in the present case no letters of administration to the estate of the intestate have yet been granted to any one. But I do not think this difference was in any way material; neither did I think this difference made any less applicable the views of Gillard J. Thus I felt that there was no merit in the arguments of the

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