The cause of action accrues upon the issuance of the Project Director's Certificate, which is critical for determining if an action is time-barred under the Limitation Act.

[9] A striking out application under O 18 r 19(1) RC is an interlocutory application within the meaning of O 41 r 5(2) RC [an exception to O 41 r 5(1) RC]. This is clear from the judgment of Abdul Kadir Sulaiman J (as he then was) in the High court case of Datuk Amir Kahar bin Tun Haji Mustapha v. Tun Mohd Said bi Keruak & Ors, [1994] 3 MLJ 737, at 741-742; [1994] 4 CLJ 656, as follows-

"The defendants' application is under O 18 r 19(1)(a), (b) and (d) of the Rules of the High 1980 ('the RHC) and under the inherent jurisdiction of the court. The application is supported by the affidavit of Wong Kian Kheong affirmed on 7 September 1994. The said affidavit merely refers to various affidavits-in-reply of the defendants filed as replies to the plaintiff's main application in the originating summons. Based on those affidavits-in-reply, the deponent verily believes that the originating summons of the plaintiff discloses no reasonable cause of action against all or any of the defendants, and/or is scandalous, frivolous, vexatious and/or is an abuse of the process of the court. In opposition to this application of the defendants, the plaintiff filed an affidavit in opposition affirmed on 22 September 1994. In the affidavit in opposition of the plaintiff, he questioned the propriety of those affidavits-in-reply referred to by the deponent of the affidavit in support of this application, since those affidavits are meant for the trial/hearing of the originating summons which had been fixed for hearing. So, the immediate issue which calls for a decision is whether the application of the defendant is defective in the light of the nature of the affidavit in support.... Order 18 r 19 does not spell out the requirement of any affidavit in support of the application. This is different from an application made under O 14 where, by r 2(1) thereof, the application must be made by summons supported by an affidavit. Similarly with an application under O 81, where by r 2(1) thereof, an affidavit is required for the application. Again, an application under O 49 r 2 is required to be supported by an affidavit. Similarly with an application under O 50 r 3, where the application must be supported by an affidavit. To cite yet another form of application is an application under O 29 r 1(2) of the RHC which must be supported by an affidavit, whereas under O 18 r 19, it merely requires an application to be made. There is no requirement in the rule of an affidavit accompanying the application. An application by summons-inchambers is no doubt an interlocutory proceeding and O 41 r 5(2) mentions an affidavit sworn for the purpose of being used in interlocutory proceedings. But in the absence of any express requirement of an affidavit to support the application in O 18 r 19, it is my view that for an application under the rule, the affidavit in support of the application is not mandatory. In the circumstances, the affidavit of Wong Kian Kheong in support of this application of the defendants is of no consequence or significance. In any event, if I am wrong in holding that an affidavit is not a prerequisite for an application under O 18 r 19, then according to O 41 r 5(2), an affidavit sworn for the purpose of being used in interlocutory proceedings may contain statements of information or belief with the sources and grounds thereof. In that light, the affidavit of Wong Kian Kheong in this case is not defective because after a reference to those affidavits, he deposed that based on the aforesaid affidavits, he verily believes that the originating summons of the plaintiff discloses no reasonable cause of action against all or any of the defendants and/or is scandalous, frivolous, vexatious and/or is an abuse of the process of court.... In the circumstances, the plaintiff's objection h