Judges should recuse themselves from cases where their previous decisions are under review to avoid perceived bias.

[1] This is a judge recusal application in relation to an application to set aside a trial judgment.

[2] The Applicant is an individual and the First Defendant in the Suit.

[3] The Respondent is also an individual and the Plaintiff in the Suit.

[4] By a notice of application dated 5 October 2017 (encl 73) ("Application"), the Applicant basically prayed that I recuse myself from hearing the Application and all other applications filed under the Suit. In addition, the Applicant prayed all proceedings under the Suit be transferred to be heard by another judge.

[5] The affidavits that were filed for purposes of the Application are as follows:

(i) Applicant's affidavit in support of Yeoh Soon Peng affirmed on 5 October 2017;

(ii) Respondent's affidavit in reply of Vasantharajan a/l N AR Nagarajan affirmed on 13 October 2017;

(iii) Applicant's affidavit in reply of Yeoh Soon Peng affirmed on 5 November 2017;

(iv) Respondent's affidavit in reply of Vasantharajan a/l N AR Nagarajan affirmed on 10 November 2017;

(v) Applicant's further affidavit of Goh Suan Bee affirmed on 10 November 2017;

(vi) Applicant's notice of intention to use affidavits dated 19 November 2017; and

(vii) Applicant's affidavit in reply (2) of Yeoh Soon Peng affirmed on 7 December 2017.

[6] After having read the written submissions filed by the parties, I heard counsel on 10 January 2018. I thereafter allowed the Application with costs to be in the cause of encl 71.

[7] I now furnish below the grounds of my decision.

Salient Background Facts

[8] This Suit was filed by the Respondent on 22 March 2016.

[9] On 7 June 2017, I entered judgment in favour of the Respondent and dismissed the Applicant's counterclaim after having proceeded to try the Suit ex-parte in the absence of the Applicant and the second defendant therein. In other words, I have considered the documentary evidence adduced as well as the testimony of witnesses called by the Respondent in the making of my judgment.

[10] My reasons for having proceeded to try the Suit ex-parte in the absence of the Applicant is found in paras 7 to 16 of my judgment in N Vasantha Rajan Nagarajan v. Yeoh Soon Peng & Anor reproduced below:

"[7] Notwithstanding that both Defendants were bankrupts; the Plaintiff has obtained the consent from the Bankruptcy Court pursuant to s 8(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1967 to proceed with this action against them on 9 September 2016 and 22 March 2016. After having been served with the writ and statement of claim, the Defendants with the sanction of the Director General of Insolvency ("DGI") were permitted to defend and counterclaim in the action through Messrs Lio & Partners and Messrs Azam-Malek & Soh respectively. The aforesaid sanction of the DGI is mandatory by virtue of s 38(1)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act 1967 and that included defending the action following Amcard Services Bhd v. Dato Joseph Chong Chek Ah & Anor, pursuing the counterclaim following M/s Laksamana Realty Sdn Bhd v. Goh Eng Hwa, [2009] 3 MLJ 97 and appointing solicitor and counsel following Perwira Affin Bank Bhd v. Sardar Mohd Roshan Khan; [2009] 4 MLJ 201; [2009] 4 CLJ 34.

[8] On 20 September 2016, Messrs Lio & Partners filed a notice of change of solicitors for the Second Defendant replacing Azam Malek & Soh. Subsequently on 11 October 2016, Messrs Faizal Azman & Associates filed another notice of change of solicitors for both Defendants replacing Messrs Lio & Partners.

[9] The matter first came up for case management before me on 7 November 2016 and I fixed the trial on 23 January 2017 after having issued the necessary pre-trial directions on filing of common agreed bundle of documents and witness statements.

[10] On 16 January 2017, just a week before the scheduled trial, the Second Defendant's solicitors applied to discha