2021 MarsdenLR 3439
HIGH COURT MALAYA SHAH ALAM
NORHASYIDAN MOHD NOR @ MOHAMAD HAZANI – Appellant
Versus
MOHD RIDHWAN ASMARA & ORS – Respondent
[Civil Appeal No: BA-12B-14-02/2020]
The appellate court affirmed that the plaintiff failed to prove negligence by the defendant in a personal injury case, emphasizing the trial judge's credibility assessments.
Headnote:(A) Evidence Act 1950 – Sections 3, 7, 8, 9, 11, 15, 114 – Personal injury action – Appeal against dismissal of liability claims – Court affirms trial judge's finding that Plaintiff failed to prove negligence of 1st Defendant leading to alleged collision – The decision upheld on grounds that factual findings are supported by credible independent witness evidence and corroborating documentary records. (Paras 1, 6, 10, 20, 32)
(B) Appellate principles – An appellate court should not interfere unless the trial judge's findings are plainly wrong; court emphasizes the credibility of oral evidence evaluated by the trial judge is paramount. (Paras 4, 5, 10, 11)
(C) Quantum assessment – Appellate review on quantum is limited to situations where trial judge acted on wrong legal principles or misapprehended facts. (Paras 26, 28)
(D) Result – Plaintiff's appeal on liability dismissed; quantum for head injuries reduced from RM150,000 to RM75,000. (Paras 32) Parties: Appellant: Plaintiff; Respondents: 1st Defendant, 2nd Defendant, 3rd Defendant.
Key Points: - (!) to (!) outline the principles of appellate interference and the "plainly wrong" test for findings of fact. - (!) to (!) describe the approach to quantum review and when appellate intervention on damages is warranted. - (!) to (!) set out the appellate court’s conclusion that the trial judge’s liability findings were not plainly wrong and no collision was proved. - (!) to (!) discuss the quantum adjustment for head injuries from RM150,000 to RM75,000 and overall dismissal of damages due to liability outcome.
What is the standard of appellate interference with findings of fact in a civil tort case?
What is the appropriate approach to reviewing quantum of damages on appeal?
What is the court’s conclusion regarding whether the trial judge erred in liability findings and the resulting damages?
Introduction
[1] The present case relates to an alleged collision of two motor vehicles in respect of which the trial court found that the Plaintiff has not proved any negligence on the part of the 1st Defendant in the alleged collision and thereafter held that it was unnecessary to find whether or not the claim was false in that no collision in fact has been proven.
[2] This is an appeal by the Plaintiff against the decision of the learned Session court Judge on liability in a judgment delivered after the full trial of the personal injury action wherein the Sessions court dismissed the Plaintiff's claims The 3rd Defendant, the insurance company, has made a cross-appeal against the quantum figures assessed provisionally by the Sessions court.
[3] The Plaintiff's liability appeal against the Sessions court's dismissal of the Plaintiff's claims was dismissed by this court on 19 February 2021, and the 3rd Defendant's quantum appeal was allowed in respect of one item of the quantum figures. The Plaintiff has appealed against this court's decision dated 19 February 2021.
Principles Of Appellate Interference
[4] In Abdul Halim bin A. Tambi v. Yong Kim Moon & Ors this court has referred to various decided authorities of the appellate courts including the Federal court's decision in Gan Yok Chin & Anor v. Lee Ing Chin & Ors, at pp 320, the court of Appeal's decison in Wasal Construction Sdn Bhd v. Boh Huat Chan Timber Products Sdn Bhd; [2014] 4 MLJ 294, the recent court of Appeal decision in Perbadanan Pengurusan 3 Two Square v. 3 Two Square Sdn Bhd & Anor, the recent Federal court judgment in Ng Hoo Kooi & Anor v. Wendy Tan Lee Peng, Pentadbir Kepada Harta Pusaka Tan Ewe Kwang, Simati & Ors, [2020] 12 MLJ 67 (wherein the Federal court has done a detailed and comprehensive analysis and discussion of the "plainly wrong" test for interfering with the factual findings of the trial courts), the Federal court's decision in Lim Choon Seng v. Lim Poh Kwee; [2020] 5 MLJ 587; [2020] 9 CLJ 1; [2020] 6 AMR 449, the House of Lords's decision in Davies v. Powell Duffryn Assoc. Collieries [1942] AC, p 616-617, followed in Collector of Stamp Duties v. Ng Fah In, [1981] 1 MLJ 288 at p 292A; also Federal court in Rasidin bin Partojo v. Frederick Kiai; [1976] 2 MLJ 214, the Supreme court's decision in Tan Kuan Yau v. Suhindrimani , ; [1985] CLJ Rep 323 (Supreme court), the Federal court's decision in Tan Kuan Yau v. Suhindrimani , ; [1985] CLJ Rep 323; followed by the court of Appeal in Laksmana Realty Sdn Bhd v. Goh Eng Hwa; [2006] 1 MLJ 675; [2005] 4 CLJ 871; [2006] 1 AMR 461 at p 682 para [16] and came to the conclusion that the principles on appellate interference that can be gleaned from the abovementioned case authorities can be summarised as follows:
(1) An appellate court should not interfere with the trial judge's findings of fact unless the trial judge has erred in principle or was plainly wrong in making such findings;
(2) When it comes to an evaluation of oral evidence, the extent to which the benefit of hearing the witnesses and watching the evidence unfold will result in the trial judge having a particular advantage over an appellate tribunal will vary from case to case. Accordingly, it is not possible to lay down any single clear general rule as to the proper approach for an appeal court to take where the appeal is against an evaluation...": per Lord Neuberger's remarks at para 60 of In Re B (a Child) (FC) [2013] UKSC 33; cited with approval by Zabariah Mohd Yusof FCJ in Ng Hoo Kooi & Anor v. Wendy Tan Lee Peng, Pentadbir Kepada Harta Pusaka Tan Ewe Kwang, Simati & Ors, [2020] 12 MLJ 67 paragraph [144];
(3) The mere fact that the appellate court would have come to a different conclusion on the evidence is not a sufficient ground for interference with factual decision except where the decision of the trial court was based entirely on inferences to be drawn from the proved facts (as opposed to findings which involved t