SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

2017 MarsdenLR 249

HIGH COURT MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR
CHAN TSE YUEN & CO – Appellant
Versus
YAP CHIN GAIK ELAINE & ORS (ENCLS 14 & 22) – Respondent
[Suit No: WA-23NCV-58-12/2016]



Solicitors' letters of demand may be protected by absolute privilege if connected to ongoing judicial proceedings, impacting liability in defamation cases.

Headnote:The judgment addresses the protection of solicitors' letters of demand under absolute privilege in defamation claims, determining that a letter sent amidst ongoing litigation serves as a precursor to a new suit and warrants such protection. The court relied on precedents regarding absolute privilege and qualified privilege in legal communications, ultimately ruling that the impugned letter was connected to the administration of justice. Consequently, it was held that the plaintiff's defamation action is struck out due to the limited publication of the letter, rendering any potential damages meager.

Table of Content
1. defendants shielded by absolute privilege in defamation due to their roles in ongoing legal proceedings. (Para 1 , 6 , 44)
2. protection of solicitors' communication in ongoing litigation (Para 3 , 4)
3. defining issues surrounding defamation and privilege (Para 7 , 10)
4. letters of demand related to ongoing proceedings are protected to support the administration of justice. (Para 8 , 30 , 108)
5. application of absolute privilege in legal claims (Para 61 , 134)
6. limited publication results in potentially insignificant damages, suggesting trial may not be warranted. (Para 62 , 72 , 130)

[1] The primary issue which arises in this case is whether a solicitors letter of demand which was issued in the course of and which related to on-going legal proceedings or which is a precursor to a new suit against the party targeted in the letter of demand, is protected by absolute privilege and thereby rendering the solicitor and their client (at whose behest the letter was issued), immune from liability for defamation. These are my grounds of judgment in respect of applications by the defendants to strike out the writ and statement of claim dated 15 December 2016, under O 18 r 19(1), (b), (c) or (d) of the Rules of 2012 ("ROC") and/or under the inherent jurisdiction of this Court.

[2] The striking out application by the first defendant ("D1") and second defendant ("D2") is encl 22 and the application by the third defendant ("D3") is encl 14. These applications are predicated on the defences of absolute privilege, qualified privilege and/or on the basis that the suit should be struck out as being an abuse of process.

Defamation

[3] This is an action for defamation by a law firm against their former client. The claim in defamation arises out of events that took place subsequent to the termination of the plaintiffs services as the solicitor representing the purchaser (D3) in a real property purchase transaction. The relevant stamp duty sum had been paid by the purchaser (D3) to the Collector of Stamp Duty. The payment was made through the plaintiff. However, the real property purchase transaction fell through as it was terminated by the vendor. After the plaintiffs services were terminated, they swiftly issued a bill for fees and disbursements. D3 disputed the bill and taxation proceedings were thereafter filed through D2. The partner in charge was D1. In the present suit, the plaintiff has named their former client (D3) and the D3s current solicitors (D1/D2), as defendants.

[4] The starting point of the dispute herein revolves around the allegation that after the plaintiffs services had been terminated, they had, without informing D3, made an application to the collector of Stamp Duty and used the relevant transaction documents and obtained a refund of the stamp duty sum.

[5] The application for refund of the stamp duty sum was done by the plaintiff before the taxation proceedings were filed, whereas the stamp duty sum was refunded to the plaintiff whilst the taxation OS were on-going. When this matter was discovered, a solicitors letter of demand was issued by D2 (on behalf of D3) which contained words or imputations which are inherently defamatory. The letter was authored by D1, a partner in D2. Thus, the plaintiffs alleged cause of action in defamation is premised upon the letter of demand which was issued by D3s solicitors (D2) who were acting for them in the taxation proceedings which were on-going. The parties to the taxation proceedings are the plaintiff and D3. The letter of demand referred to the plaintiffs conduct in surreptitiously obtaining a refund of the stamp duty sum by using the transaction documents which is relevant to one of the reliefs sought in the taxation proceedings. The letter of demand was also the precursor to a new legal suit by D3 against the plaintiff. The defendants have also described the letter of demand as the document which "initiated" the new suit by D3 against the plaintiff.

The Issues

[6] The

Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
logo-black

An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance

qr

Scan Me!

India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

whatsapp-icon Back to top