Interlocutory injunctions in defamation cases are not granted if the defendant pleads justification and fair comment unless the plaintiff proves the statements are untrue.

JUDGMENT

Mohd Arief Emran Ariffin JC:

A. Introduction

[1] The Plaintiff, a Malaysian company, alleges that it was defamed by the Defendant for various statements that were published by the Defendant on his Facebook account.

[2] The alleged statements appear at paras 6, 8, 11, 16, 23, 29, 38, and 44 of the Plaintiff's Statement of Claim.

[3] The Plaintiff also alleges in its Statement of Claim that based on the aforesaid libellous statements, the Defendant is guilty of unlawfully interfering with its business.

[4] The Defendant admits making the said statements on his Facebook account but alleges that these statements were true, justified and rely on the defence of fair comment.

[5] The Plaintiff seeks an interlocutory injunction to prevent the Defendant from making the aforesaid alleged defamatory statements and for an order that the Defendant removes the aforesaid publication with immediate effect.

[6] After considering the pleadings, notice of application, affidavits, submissions, and oral arguments presented by parties, I dismissed the application in encl 3 with costs in the cause. The following paragraphs contain my reasoning for dismissing the Plaintiff's application.

B. Applicable Law

[7] The principles applicable in an application for an interim injunction concerning a claim for libel and slander are trite and can be seen from the decision of the Malaysian Supreme Court in The News Straits Times Press (M) Bhd v. Airasia Bhd, .

[8] In that case, Abdul Hamid Ag LP (as he then was) stated:-

"However, in deciding whether or not to grant an interlocutory injunction the Court must exercise its discretion judicially. It is of cardinal importance to bear in mind that?

"Because of the Court's reluctance to fetter free speech and because the questions that arise during the proceedings, such as whether the meaning is defamatory, whether justification or fair comment are applicable and as to malice, are generally for the jury, interlocutory injunctions are granted less readily in defamation proceedings than in other matters and according to different principles." Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition, Vol 28, para 167. (See Quartz Hill Consolidated Gold Mining v. Beall [1882] 20 Ch D 501).

In Bonnard v. Perryman [1891] 2 Ch 269, 284, Lord Coleridge CJ delivering the judgment of the Court in which Lord Esher MR, and Lindley, Bowen and Lopes LJJ concurred, emphasised that:

"The right of free speech is one which it is for the public interest that individuals should possess, and indeed, that they should exercise without impediment, so long as no wrongful act is done; and, unless an alleged libel is untrue, there is no wrong committed; but, on the contrary, often a very wholesome act is performed in the publication and repetition of an alleged libel. Until it is clear that an alleged libel is untrue, it is not clear that any right at all has been infringed; and the importance of leaving free speech unfettered is a strong reason in cases of libel for dealing most cautiously and warily with the granting of interim injunctions. We entirely approve of, and desire to adopt as our own, the language of Lord Esher, MR in Coulson v. Coulson? 'To justify the Court in granting an interim injunction it must come to a decision upon the question of libel or no libel, before the jury have decided whether it was a libel or not. Therefore, the jurisdiction was of a delicate nature. It ought only to be exercised in the clearest cases, where any jury would say that the matter complained of was libellous, and where, if the jury did not so find, the Court would set aside the verdict as unreasonable."

Bonnard's case and Monson v. Tussauds Ltd [1894] 1 QB 671 were followed in Crest Homes Ltd v. Ascott [1980] FSR 396, where the trial Judge granted an interlocutory injunction against the defendant who said that he would justify his assertions. Allowing the appeal and discharging the injunction, the Court (CA) held:

"(1) There was no reason to depart from the general rule th