JUDGMENT

Suffian LP:

We dismissed these two appeals and now give our reasons. (This was in fact one appeal given one number, but by two appellants, and it is convenient to refer to it as two appeals).

These two appeals were from the judgment of the High Court sitting in Ipoh convicting and sentencing to death the two appellants who had been charged with murdering the late CPO, Perak, and his driver in broad daylight in Ipoh and with having under their control firearms and ammunition without lawful excuse and lawful authority. The charges and the facts as found by the learned trial Judge are set out in full in the judgment which has been reported at [1977] 1 MLRH 475, [1978] 2 MLJ 204; and there is no need to repeat them.

The grounds of appeal related, first, to the evidence which it was argued was not enough to support the convictions, and, secondly, to an important point of law.

Mr. Karpal Singh on behalf of the appellants argued that the convictions were against the weight of evidence. As we indicated during the course of arguments there was no merit in this ground. During the course of their investigation the police collected more than ample evidence which was brought before the Court to justify the convictions and the police are to be congratulated on the high standard of their investigations in this very difficult case. Also, every point in favour of the appellants had been carefully considered by the learned trial Judge in his judgment, despite the strains under which he was put as a result of the appellants' contemptuous attitude and conduct in Court during the trial.

As regards the point of law urged on us by Mr. Karpal Singh, before setting it out it is desirable to give the background. Parliament was dissolved on 20 March 1969, and general elections to the House of Representatives ("the lower House") were held beginning on Saturday, 10 May. On the Sunday most of the results were published, and on the following Tuesday, 13 May riots broke out, mainly in Kuala Lumpur. Two days later the Yang di-Pertuan Agong proclaimed a state of emergency under art 150(1) of the Constitution which was published as PU(A) 145/1969. At the same time acting under clause (2) of that Article he promulgated the Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance, 1969, published as PU(A) 146/69, ("Ordinance 1") giving himself wide powers for securing public safety, etc.: including power to make provisions departing from the Criminal Procedure Code and the Evidence Act. By s 7 of the Ordinance he suspended all uncompleted elections to the lower House. It is to be noted that all these things were done at a time when Parliament was not sitting.

Parliament did not sit again until 20 February 1971, when Government felt that security had improved and uncompleted elections had been completed.

Thus there was no sitting of Parliament at all between 20 March 1969, the date of dissolution, and 20 February 1971, a period of nearly two years.

Some time in 1975 His Majesty promulgated the Essential (Security Cases) Regulations, 1975, published as PU(A) 326 and 392 of 1975, in purported exercise of his powers under Ordinance 1, providing for the trial of persons charged with "security offences" in accordance with the special provisions of the regulations. The appellants were tried in accordance with these provisions.

It is to be noted that these regulations were made after Parliament had sat. In Teh Cheng Poh v. Public Prosecutor, [1978] 1 MLJ 30,(1) however, it was held by the Privy Council that once Parliament had sat, His Majesty had no power to make Essential Regulations having the force of law, and that accordingly the regulations were ultra vires the Constitution and for that reason void.

Subsequently, Parliament by the Emergency (Essential Powers) Act, 1979, Act 216, purported to validate the Ordinance and regulations, and this Court held on 27 April 1979, that they have indeed been validated by the Act. [1979] 2 MLJ 243.

Notwithstanding that, Mr. Karpal Singh argued in t