MacIntyre J:

In this case, Mr. Davidson on behalf of defendants Nos one, two and three, and Mr. Sharma on behalf of defendant No four, have taken the point that this suit is not maintainable and is bad in law on the ground that it can only be brought by or in the name of the Attorney General or with the consent of the Attorney General. They rely on s. 9(3) of the Government Proceedings Ordinance No. 58 of 1956 in support of their argument.

Mr. Dharmananda for the plaintiffs did not seriously contest the point and suggested that in the event of my holding that the suit should have been brought by the Attorney General, I should give leave to the plaintiffs to substitute the Attorney General as was done in the case of Cheah Ewe Chong & Anor. v. Cheah Kee Ee & Ors. [1934] MLJ 212.

Sub-section (2) of s. 9 merely emphasises the necessity to conform to the provisions of sub-section (1) if any of the reliefs mentioned therein are claimed.

Sub-section (3) lays down the rule that except as to the procedure to be followed in obtaining the reliefs specified in sub-ss. (1) and (2), all other suits and proceedings relating to any such trust or otherwise in which the Government is interested, or in which the interest of the public are affected, or which if brought in England the Attorney General of England would be a necessary party, shall be brought and had in the name of the Attorney General as plaintiff or defendant.

Since the reliefs claimed in the present action are brought on behalf of a charitable trust and are not among the claims specified in sub-section (1), I hold that sub-section (3) applies and that the suit should have been brought and had in the name of the Attorney General.

As for the oral application by Mr. Dharmananda for leave to amend the statement of claim to substitute the Attorney General, I am satisfied this is a proper case in which I should grant that indulgence since the suit is brought on behalf of a charitable trust, and the plaintiffs have no personal axe to grind. However, I am unable to make an order at this stage without the consent of the Attorney General.

Further hearing of the suit is therefore adjourned to 19 July 1965 to enable the plaintiffs to apply to substitute the Attorney General. In default, the case will stand dismissed with costs; the costs to be borne personally by the plaintiffs. If, however, in the meantime the Attorney General is substituted then all questions of costs would be reserved for argument on the adjourned date.

Order accordingly.