In medical negligence cases, the plaintiff must prove duty of care, breach of standard of care, breach of duty, and causation to succeed.

[1] The appellant appeals against the decision of the learned High Court Judge who dismissed the claim for medical negligence, inter alia, on the grounds that the appellant/plaintiff had failed to prove the case on a balance of probabilities against the respondents/defendants.

[2] After having perused the notes of evidence, what was glaringly obvious in the instant case was that the appellant has not proved her case according to law as advocated in medical negligence cases (see Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 2 All ER 118, Bolitho v. City and Hackney Health Authority [1997] 3 WLR 1151, Dato' Dr V Thuraisingam & Anor v. Sanmarkan Ganapathy & Anor, 2015 MarsdenLR 2390 and Foo Fio Na v. Dr Soo Fook Mun & Anor; 2007 MarsdenLR 2757 ; ; [2002] 2 AMR 1524.

[3] The learned counsel for the appellant, as damage control to the omission to prove the case according to law in medical negligence cases, asserted that they are entitled to rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which the appellant says will shift the evidential burden to negate negligence on the respondents.

[4] When we queried whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will apply to medical negligence cases when the plaintiff is alleging specific instances of negligence as in the instant case, the learned counsel was not able to produce any authority on point to assist the Court [Emphasis Added].

[5] The memorandum of appeal of the appellant reads as follows:

"1.(a) The learned judge erred both in law and in fact when she failed to appreciate that whilst the burden of proof always remained with the appellant to prove her case, yet the evidential burden had shifted to the respondents in this case.

(b) The learned judge failed to appreciate that whilst it was the respondents' case all along that the appellant suffered from immature teratoma and that the respondents relied on the reports of the pathologists, endocrinologists and the radiologists to make the said diagnosis, but the learned judge erred in law in failing to hold that the reports of the pathologists, endocrinologists and the radiologists were marked as ID and not admitted into evidence and that these witnesses were never called to testify, and in the circumstances the respondents had failed to rebut the evidential burden that had shifted to them to support their diagnosis of immature teratoma.

2. (a) The learned judge erred in law and in fact when she held in her judgment that the appellant had "strenuously objected" to additional witnesses being called by the respondents after all parties were directed by the Court during case management to file their respective list of witnesses, when the learned judge overlooked her own ruling which she made after hearing submissions from all parties, that no additional witnesses would be allowed to testify since the respondents had chosen not to include them as witnesses in the 1st defendant's list of witnesses.

(b) Therefore having led the appellant to believe that all the relevant documents relied on by the respondents remained as ID and therefore not subject to cross-examination, the learned judge erred in law when she overruled her own decision and admitted the documents marked as ID as admissible documents without giving the appellant the right to cross-examine the makers of the said documents.

(c) By allowing the documents marked as ID to become exhibits without the appellant being allowed to cross-examine the makers of the said documents the appellant has suffered a breach of natural justice which warrants judicial interference by an appellate Court.

3. (a) The learned judge erred in law and in fact when she held that PW1, ie Dr Lavarajah was not an oncologist nor an expert on cancer