The title of a bona fide purchaser is indefeasible unless proven otherwise, even in the presence of competing claims known to other parties.

[1] This is an appeal against the decision of the High Court at Shah Alam which had on 3 February 2016 allowed the plaintiff/1st respondent's action for a declaration that he is a bona fide purchaser and proprietor of a piece of land known as hak milik Geran No GM 175, Lot Number 752, Mukim Ijuk, Daerah Kuala Selangor, Selangor; which he had purchased pursuant to a Sale and Purchase Agreement (SPA) dated 27 January 2005 between him and the 1st defendant/2nd respondent. The High Court also allowed the plaintiff's other reliefs, namely that the transfer of the said land from the plaintiff/1st respondent to the 2nd defendant/1st appellant by Presentation No 1767/2012 and from the 2nd defendant /1st appellant to the 3rd defendant/3rd appellant by presentation no 3 are not valid, and costs.

[2] For the purpose of this appeal, parties would be referred to as they were in the High Court.

[3] The land was originally registered under the 1st defendant's father's name, Tan Yew Lin (TYL). TYL had passed away on 23 October 1995.

[4] Upon TYL's death, vide a Distribution Order dated 22 December 1997 as shown at pp 128-129 of Record of Appeal Jilid 2 (1), the 1st defendant inherited the land. TYL had a brother by the name of Tan Tuan Kam (TTK). TTK married the 2nd defendant and they have a son who is the 3rd defendant. TTK had also passed away.

[5] It was the 2nd and 3rd defendants' contention that the land was registered under TYL's name although TTK was the one who bought it, because TTK wanted to help TYL who was then unemployed; and upon a promise made by TYL that he would later transfer the land to TTK. It was also the 2nd and 3rd defendants' contention that before the 1st defendant was born in 1972, TTK's family developed the land and planted rubber trees, palm oil and fruit trees on it and shared the proceeds from the income obtained therefrom.

[6] The 2nd and 3rd defendants also contended that TYL had indeed signed Form 14A on 30 September 1995 to transfer the land to the 2nd defendant in the presence of the 1st defendant. However, the said Form 14A was rejected by the Land Office as the 1st defendant had subsequently entered a caveat on the land.

[7] The 2nd defendant had on 24 September 2004, filed a civil suit number 21211-2004 (2004 case) against the 1st and 4th defendants seeking for the Court's order to declare that the land was at all material time vested in her, for the 1st defendant to transfer the land to her and for any caveat entered by the 1st defendant be revoked.

[8] On 16 December 2010, the 2nd defendant managed to obtain a judgment in default in the 2004 case against the 1st defendant for failure to attend the Court and comply with the Court's direction to appoint a lawyer to represent him.

[9] Following the judgment in default, on 5 April 2011 a consent order was entered between the 2nd and 4th defendants in the 2004 case for the 4th defendant to register the 2nd defendant as the land's proprietor; and it was also ordered by consent that all dealings by the 1st defendant in relation to the land were not valid.

Issues

(i) Whether the judgment in default and the consent judgment both dated 16 December 2010 can be set aside by the Court of concurrent jurisdiction?;

(ii) Whether the principle of res judicata apply?;