George Seah SCJ:

This is an appeal by the wife (hereinafter referred to as the appellant) against an Order of Siti Norma Yaakob J directing that the maintenance order dated 4 May 1979 for the period from 6 June 1983 to 5 January 1984 be rescinded. The learned Judge further directed that the amount of the maintenance be reduced in the manner following:

(a) From RM1,500 to RM800 per month from 6 January 1984 to 31 May 1985 and

(b) From RM800 to RM400 per month from 1 June 1985 onwards until further order.

The appellant was dissatisfied with these decisions and has appealed to the Supreme Court.

The first point taken by learned Counsel for the appellant was that the Court had no power to rescind an order for maintenance from 6 June 1983 to 5 January 1984 or for any other period of time. This contention was disputed by learned Counsel for the husband (hereinafter referred to as the respondent). In our opinion, the answer to this submission depends upon the true construction to be given to ss. 83 and 96 of the Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). It is common ground that these sections give to the Court a general power to vary or rescind any subsisting periodical payments for the wife (s. 83) and /or the children (s. 96) of the marriage where it is satisfied that it was based on any misrepresentation or mistake of fact or where there has been any material change in the circumstances.

Now to "rescind" means to abrogate, annual, revoke, cancel, discharge or to put an end to altogether. It follows that when a maintenance order is rescinded by a Court order it ceases to exist henceforth. Adopting this interpretation, we are constrained to hold that the general power contained in ss. 83 and 96 of the Act does not empower the Court to make an order discharging the maintenance order for a limited period of time. That however, is not the end of the matter. It seems to us that the learned Judge did not intend to abrogate the maintenance order altogether as it was clear from the latter part of the Court Order that it was to take effect at a reduced rate of RM800 per month from 6 January 1984 to 31 May 1985 and thereafter at RM400 each month from 1 June 1985 onwards. It appears to us that the learned Judge has intended the maintenance order to be suspended during the period when the respondent was unemployed after having been retrenched by his employer from 6 June 1983 to 5 January 1984. The question we have to determine was whether or not the Court had the power to do so under ss. 83 and 96 of the Act? In our opinion, the word to "vary " should be given a wide meaning and should not be confined only to increase or reduce the amount of the periodical payments of maintenance for the wife and/or the children of the marriage but also to include power to "suspend" the maintenance order or any provisions therein temporarily and to revive the operation of the maintenance order or any provisions so suspended. Applying this to the facts herein we rule that the learned Judge had the power under the provisions of ss. 83 and 96 of the Act to make an order suspending the operation of the order of maintenance during the period from 6 June 1983 to 5 January 1984 respectively. In making such an Order the learned Judge appeared to have taken the undermentioned factors into consideration:

(a) That the respondent was unemployed during this 7-month period when he was retrenched by his company;

(b) That he had to borrow money from his mother to discharge a bank loan he obtained from United Asian Bank on the security of a house at Ukay Heights, Kuala Lumpur which is registered in the name of the appellant during this period of unemployment;

(c) That he was forced to ask for further loans from his mother and sister:

(i) to pay the taxed costs of the divorce proceedings amounting to RM8,414.62,

(ii) to pay his own legal fees of RM10,415.27,

(iii) to settle a judgment-debt of RM2,469.67 in favour of the appellant an