Abdul Hamid Omar CJ:

[1] His Royal Highness the Sultan of Selangor has sought to strike out the originating summons issued at the instance of Mr Karpal Singh, the plaintiff, under O 18 r 19 of the Rules of the High 1980, and/or the inherent jurisdiction of the Court.

[2] By his originating summons Mr Karpal Singh seeks determination of this Court and a declaration to the effect that the public statement allegedly made by the Sultan on 26 July 1987 and reported in the New Straits Times and The star newspapers of the next day, that he would not pardon anyone who has been sentenced to the mandatory death sentence for drug trafficking in the State of Selangor, is in violation of art 42 of the Federal Constitution (hereafter called 'the Constitution') in that the Sultan can only reject a petition for clemency after considering the advice of the Selangor pardons board and then applying his mind to the petition before him.

[3] In support, Mr Karpal Singh relies entirely on the press reports as regards the statements attributed to the Sultan allegedly made at the opening of the general meeting of the ex-servicemen's association, Selangor branch. Photostatic copies of the press reports are exhibited.

[4] Mr Karpal Singh affirms that by publicly stating that he would not pardon anyone who has been sentenced to death for drug trafficking in the state of Selangor, the Sultan was effectively preempting any appeal to him for clemency thereby resulting in the negation of a constitutional right.

[5] Mr Karpal Singh also affirms that he has the necessary locus standi to bring these proceedings by virtue of his oath of office as a member of Parliament which enjoins him to preserve, protect and defend the constitution.

[6] It is Mr Karpal Singh's contention that art 181(2) of the Constitution which states that no proceedings whatsoever shall be brought in any Court against the ruler of a state in his personal capacity will not apply to the present case because the statement attributed to the Sultan was made in his official capacity.

[7] The application to strike out is founded on grounds that (1) the originating summons discloses no reasonable cause of action in that the issue raised therein is not justiciable; (2) the originating summons is barred by reason of the provisions of art 181(2) of the Constitution; (3) Mr Karpal Singh has no locus standi to maintain the proceedings he has brought; and (4) the originating summons is scandalous, frivolous and/or an abuse of the process of the Court.

Principles Governing And Application Made Under Order 18 Rules 19 Of The Rules Of The High 1980

[8] The principle is well-established. The Court has stated in Sim Kie Chon v. Superintendent of Pudu Prison & Ors, [1985] 2 MLJ 385; [1985] CLJ (Rep) 293 that the principle is clear in that "it is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should be had to the summary process under O 18 r 19 of the Rules of the High 1980: 'The summary procedure under this Rule can only be adopted when it can clearly be seen that a claim or answer is on the face of it 'obviously unsustainable'.'

(Attorney-General of Duchy of Lancaster v. L & NW Railway Co [1892] 3 Ch 274 (Supreme Court Practice 1985))."

[10] I would also observe that there seems to be a flaw in