Eusoffe Abdoolcader FJ:

A trade union recognition dispute between the appellant and the second respondent was referred to the first respondent, the Minister of Labour and Manpower, who gave his decision on 23 November 1981 in Form D as prescribed by the Industrial Relations Regulations, 1980 that the appellant extend recognition to the second respondent as from 22 June 1981 for the categories of employees stipulated therein. The appellant by an ex parte motion taken out on 9 January 1982 sought leave to apply for certiorari to quash this decision of the Minister `made under s. 9(5) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 and dated the 23 November 1981'. Leave was granted accordingly by an order made by Hashim Yeop A. Sani, J, on 5 February 1982 whereupon the appellant applied by a substantive motion inter partes on 17 February 1982 for certiorari. The learned Judge heard the application and dismissed it on 29 July 1982 aquo the appellant lodge an appeal to this Court.

At the outset of the hearing of this appeal we raised the question of the appellant being out of time in his application for leave for certiorari in the light of the provisions of O. 53 r. 1A of the Rules of the High Court 1980, the relevant part of which specifically provides that leave shall not be granted to apply for an order of certiorari unless the application for leave is made within six weeks after the date of the proceeding or the delay is accounted for to the satisfaction of the Court or Judge to whom the application for leave is made. As the decision of the Minister sought to be impugned is dated 23 November 1981, the period of six weeks would, on a computation under O. 3 & 2(2) of the Rules of the High Court, expire on 5 January 1982, and as the application for leave was made on 9 January 1982 the appellant was clearly out of time and no extension of time was sought nor the delay accounted for to the satisfaction of the learned Judge who heard the application as required by the rule. Apparently this point completely escaped all parties involved, as a result perhaps of an affliction of incorrigible somnolence that seems to pervade the perception of the law and practice of the profession from time to time. We took the point ourselves as it clearly goes to the jurisdiction of the Court from which leave to apply for certiorari was sought as O. 53 r. 1(1) stipulates that no application for an order of certiorari shall be made unless leave therefor has been granted and r. 1A which we have already adverted to enacts that leave shall not be granted except in accordance with its specific provisions.

Lord Hodson said in his judgment in Secretary of State for Defence v. Waom [1970] AC 394, 402 (at p. 402): "Procedural sections are usually mandatory and there is nothing which points to the contrary in this case". In the matter before us the terms of O. 53 rr. 1 and 1A clearly reflect the imperative requirements which must be complied with before an application for certiorari can be made. Power in the High Court in regard to certiorari is provided for in the Courts of Judicature Act, 1964 in para. 1 of the Schedule thereto which sets out the additional powers of the High Court referred to in s. 25(2) of the Act but the proviso to s. 25 specifically enacts that all such powers of the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction as are referred to therein shall be exercised in accordance with any written law or rules of Court relating to the same [Pahang South Union Omnibus Co. Bhd. v. Minister of Labour and Manpower & Anor. [1981] CLJ (Rep) 74;. We should perhaps mention that when we first put the point in question to Counsel for the respondents for their views, both of them somewhat half-heartedly indicated they were taking no objection on this aspect, presumably because it had never occurred to them before, and that they were prepared to waive non-compliance with the provisions of O. 53 r. 1A if there was any; but after an overnight adjournment granted a