Hashim Yeop A Sani J (delivering the judgment of the Court):

The appeals are from the decision of the Disciplinary Committee appointed by the Chief Justice to investigate into a complaint made against the appellants, two senior members of the legal profession. Very briefly, the background of the matter is as follows. On or about 19 August 1975 one Lee Kwang made a complaint to the Johore Bar Committee to the effect that a sum of $49,423.30 had been paid (in cash) by him to one Charlie Chin (chief clerk of the appellants' firm) and not returned. He was issued with a receipt No. 0600 dated 10 July 1973 (Exh. P1). The payment was said to be towards the purchase of certain lands. Since payment of the said sum it was complained that the solicitors failed to return the same and refused to advise the complainant on the progress of the purchase of the lands despite several requests by him. P1 is an official receipt of the firm issued in respect of the client's account. P1 was signed by Ramanathan (the cashier) of the appellants' firm. The Disciplinary Committee was appointed on 30 October 1975.

The new Legal Profession Act, 1976 came into force on 1 June 1977 superseding the Advocates and Solicitors Ordinance, 1947. It appears that the Disciplinary Committee decided that notwithstanding that it was appointed before the commencement of the Legal Profession Act, 1976 it was deemed to be appointed under that Act and the proceedings to proceed as though they were commenced under that Act. This view appears at the beginning of the "statement of its findings" preceding the Order. The Disciplinary Committee commenced its proceedings on 4 January 1977 and finally by its Order dated 1 November 1979 directed that both appellants be suspended from practising as advocates and solicitors for a period of twelve months from the date of the Order.

During the hearing the appellants put up a defence in the alternative. First it was their contention that since the receipt (P1) was issued by the appellants' agents and/or servants, therefore they themselves were not in breach of any rule of conduct or ethics. The other defence was that the money was never in fact paid to the chief clerk of the appellants' firm. After analysing the facts of the case from the evidence adduced before it, the Disciplinary Committee made its findings as follows:

The Committee feels that it cannot give credence to the act of issuing the subject receipt without the moneys acknowledged in such receipt as having been paid to someone in the Solicitors' firm.

Further it said:

Solicitors in the course of practising their profession continually receive moneys on behalf of clients which places them in a position of trust but the very foundation of such trust would be completely destroyed if a Solicitor is able to absolve himself from liability to account for any such moneys by contending that although an official receipt was issued by him or his firm he is able to claim that no such moneys were received by him or his servants or employees and that no record of such moneys appears in his or his firm's books of account. The Committee cannot and does not accept such a contention and would be derelict in its duty if it did so.

It is clear from the above that the Disciplinary Committee has made unequivocal findings of fact. In its view the partners of the solicitors firm should have taken immediate steps to determine their liabilities and responsibilities to the complainant as their client and that both the appellants admitted it was the practice of their firm that both the chief clerk (Charlie Chin) and the cashier (Ramanathan) could receive moneys and issue valid and binding receipts on behalf of the firm. The Disciplinary Committee concluded that in so doing both the appellants were bound by the actions of the persons they so authorised. It was therefore the firm finding of the Disciplinary Committee that the appellants were guilty of misconduct in their practice as advoca