McMullin J:

These two applications arise out of a family dispute concerning the estate of Ang Kim Boey who died intestate in 1952. His eldest son Ang Leng Chuan was granted Letters of Administration to his father's estate. The complaint which is the substance of the action now sought to be prosecuted against his widow and his estate is that, in the 19 years between the death of the elder Ang and that of his eldest son and administrator in 1974, the latter never attempted to carry out his duties as administrator and never distributed the considerable assets of the deceased to those who were entitled to them but instead assumed proprietary management of those assets in breach of trust and to his own, and his wife's, enormous enrichment at the cost of the other beneficiaries: his mother and his four brothers, his sister and a half-sister.

After the death of Ang Leng Chuan his younger brother, Ang Leng Tat, was granted Letters of Administration to the father's estate. He is plaintiff in this action in which he seeks to sue personally and as administrator on behalf of the other beneficiaries. Mdm Ang Leng Chuan, the widow, sought to obtain administration of her husband's estate but her brother-in-law (the plaintiff) forestalled this by lodging a caveat with the Probate Officer under s. 29 of the Probate and Administration Enactment, 1955. He now seeks an order of this Court appointing the widow of his deceased brother to represent the estate of his late brother for the purposes of this action, invoking for that purpose the provisions of O. 15 r. 6A(4) of the English Supreme Court Rules.

To all of this the defendant, and administratrix - presumptive to the estate of Ang Leng Chuan, replies with an application to strike out the writ as frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the Court's process. Mr. Humphrey Ball who appears for the defendant contends that, as at present constituted, the action is incompetent because, he says, there is no power to institute such an action in the High Court at all. There are other objections to the form of the proceedings of a less sweeping nature but to these I will return later.

This radical proposition raises a question of considerable interest and no little difficulty. The argument goes thus:

The Probate and Administration Enactment, 1955 sets up the office of the Probate Officer in substitution for the Probate Division of the High Court, such as exists in England and other common law jurisdictions, and makes it the sole forum for dealing with all questions arising out of the administration of the estates of deceased persons. The Enactment is, Mr. Ball says, a comprehensive, exclusive and exhaustive code not only for giving the basic right to apply for probate and administration of such estates but also for regulating the practice and procedure whereby such applications may be made and dealt with. Mr. Ball points to the seven general powers given to the Probate Officer by s. 6 of the Enactment and says that these constitute the full range of equitable powers necessary to deal with all questions, contentious and non-contentious, which may arise in the course of any administration. The only powers left to the High Court or any other forum, he says, are those expressly conferred by s. 83 of the Enactment which enable the Probate Officer to refer a question of law to the High Court; and s. 84 which gives right of appeal from decisions of the Probate Officer to the High Court and beyond that to the Court of Appeal. It is a persuasive argument but upon reflection I do not find myself convinced. There is no doubt that the basic right to Probate and Letters of Administration derives in Brunei from this Enactment. This is well attested by the short title and by the first of the explanatory notes appended at the end of the Enactment. But that law is curiously reticent on matters which one would think must have been mentioned if it is indeed to be regarded as an exhaustive procedural code and as pr