Ajaib Singh SCJ:

[1] This was an appeal by the appellants against the decision of the High Court dated 7 December 1988 whereby the appellants' application for leave to apply for an order of certiorarito quash the Industrial Court Award No 234 of 1988 dated 9 September 1988 was dismissed. Also dismissed by the High Court in the same application was for leave to apply for an order of mandamus that the Industrial Court hears and determines according to law the appellants' application for interpretation under s 33(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967.

[2] By way of ex parte notice of motion dated 7 October 1988 the appellants applied to the High Court seeking the following relief:

1. leave be granted to the applicants to apply for an order of certiorari to bring up and quash Industrial Court Award No 234 of 1988 dated 9 September 1988.

2. leave be granted to the applicants for an order of mandamus directed to the Industrial Court to hear and determine according to law the applicants' application for interpretation dated 23 May 1988 under s 33(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 by a different Division of the Industrial Court from that which made the said Award No 234 of 1988.

[3]Section 33(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 reads as follows:

If any question arises as to the interpretation of any award or collective agreement taken cognizance of by the Court, the Minister may refer the question, or any party bound by the award or agreement may apply, to the Court for a decision on the question.

[4] The grounds upon which the relief was sought were set out in the appellants' statement pursuant to O 53 of the Rules of the High as follows:

In making the said Award No 234/88 the Industrial Court did not take into account matters it ought to have taken into account instead took into account matters it should not have taken into account and thereby exceeded and or acted without jurisdiction in particular:

i misconstruing s 33 of the said Act and not taking into account the provisions of s 52(2) of the said Act.

ii misconstruing the provisions of s 33(5) of the said Act.

iii not according the applicants the right to be heard on the merits or demerits of their application in compliance with the principles of natural justice as enshrined in s 33(3) of the said Act before dismissing the said application.

[5] In an affidavit filed by Hiew Sit Sang the general secretary of appellants states inter alia as follows:

Pursuant to s 33(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 (hereinafter referred to as "the said Act") the applicants filed an application in the relevant statutory form for interpretation of art 34 of the Industrial Court Award No 54/81 and art 31 of the 1984 Collective Agreement in both of which Award and Collective Agreement the applicants and the respondents were parties.

Subsequently the respondents filed a statement in reply as directed by the Industrial Court.

The matter was fixed for hearing on 7 September 1988 by the Industrial Court constituted by the learned President and a panel of 3 members. I was present in Court on 7 September 1988 with the applicants' Counsel.

At the commencement of proceedings on 7 September 1988 the applicants' Counsel pointed out to the Court about the provisions of s 33(5) of the said Act as to constitution of the Court as a preliminary requirement to be complied with before the Court proceeded to hear the merits or demerits of the applicants' substantive application.

The Industrial Court took note of this preliminary issue and then after a brief submission by Counsel adjourned for about thirty minutes and ruled that the applicants' application is "struck-off".

I verily believe that when the applicants' Counsel asked for confirmation that the matter was being "struck-off", the learned President of the Court confirmed it and stated that the Court's written grounds for the ruling will be given in due course.

On 15 September 1988 the applicants' solicitors received the said written grounds of the Cour