Chang Min Tat FJ (delivering the judgment of the Court):

The defendant Haron bin Mohd Zaid (Haron) applies for the leave of this Court to appeal to His Majesty the Yang di-Pertuan Agong from two orders made by this Court, the first an order made on 27 February 1979 and the second an order made on 16 May 1979.

Appeals to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong are governed by the provisions of s. 74 of the Courts of Judicature Act, 1964. An appeal lies with the leave of the Federal Court,

"74(1)(a) from any final judgment or order in any civil matter where

(i) the matter in dispute in the appeal amounts to or is of the value of twentyfive thousand dollars or upwards;

(ii) the appeal involves, directly or indirectly, some claim or question to or respecting property or some civil right of like amount or value; or

(iii) the case is from its nature a fit one for appeal; and

(b) from any interlocutory judgment or order which the Federal Court considers a fit one for appeal.

Section 75(1) sets a time limit of six weeks for an application for leave from the date on which the decision appealed against was made. Time may however be extended by the Federal Court. Section 75(2) spells out the powers of the Federal Court to set conditions regarding the execution of the order sought to be appealed from or for a stay.

Though the leave of the Federal Court is required in all cases, Lopez v. Velliappa Chettiar [1968] 1 MLJ 224 PC has laid down what appears so clearly in the wording that an appeal under s. 74(1)(a)(i) or (ii) is as of right and the Federal Court has no discretion to refuse leave to appeal. The leave for appeals under s. 74(1)(a)(i) or (ii) is referrable only to the conditions for such leave in s. 75. The Federal Court has discretion to refuse leave only in cases which come within s. 74(1)(a)(iii) or 74(1)(b). In the latter case, leave will only be granted if in the opinion of this Court, the interlocutory judgment or order is one fit for appeal.

The earlier order is a dismissal of Haron's application to abort the appeal of the third party in the action, Central Securities, from the High Court to this Court on a contention that the appeal being one from an interlocutory judgment or order was without the leave of a Judge of a High Court in Chambers as required by s. 68(2) Courts of Judicature Act, 1964 and therefore not properly brought before this Court. The second is an order setting aside the order giving. Haron leave to sign final judgment against Central Securities on a summons for directions brought by Haron against the third party.

Mr George for Haron concedes, in our opinion entirely correctly, that both orders he seeks the leave of this Court to appeal from are interlocutory. An order setting aside an award of an arbitration has been held to be interlocutory: Re Croasdell & Cammell Laird & Co. [1906] 2 KB 569. He accepts the burden of satisfying us that they are fit ones for appeal. He concedes further that so far he has lost nothing really. Haron's claim against the third party will go to trial and stands to be adjudicated. But he does not see why he should lose the benefit of his earlier victory in the form of the O. 14 judgment in the High Court and in his view, his best course would be to restore this judgment before their Lordships of the Privy Council by an objection to the appeal from the High Court to the Federal Court on purely procedural grounds. It is his contention that the several decisions on appeal procedure conflict and urgently require final determination by the highest Court.

It may be convenient to deal, at this stage, with his procedural objections.

Section 68(2) reads:

(2) No appeal shall lie from an interlocutory order made by a Judge of a High Court in Chambers, unless the Judge has certified, after application within four days after the making of such order by any party for further argument in Court, that he requires no further argument or unless leave is obtained from the Federal Court or