The appellant was found guilty of trafficking on his own behalf of dangerous drugs to wit 2,700 grammes of cannabis, an offence under section 39B(1)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance, 1952, on December 27, 1977 at about 1.45 p.m. at the Railway Station, Padang Besar, Perlis and was sentenced to life imprisonment and with four strokes of the rotan. He has now appealed against both the conviction and sentence.

Mr. Jag-jit Singh appeared for the appellant and D.P.P. Abdul Malik bin Haji Ishak for the respondent. There are six grounds of appeal and grounds 2, 3, 4 & 5 are dealt with together.

The first ground alleges that the learned trial President failed to scrutinize the evidence of P.W.4, the police inspector who recorded the cautioned statement from the appellant, in its proper perspective. Had he done so he would not have admitted it. In the court below, the learned President held a trial within a trial to consider the voluntariness of the cautioned statement recorded by P.W.4 from the accused. After hearing the prosecution witnesses and the accused and after listening to the submissions of the prosecuting officer and the defence counsel, he held that the statement was voluntary and admitted it as evidence (Ex. P.14). It was submitted that the inspector (P.W.4) was also the investigating officer in that case and as such it was highly undesirable for him to have recorded the statement. Secondly, after the caution was administered, P.W.4 failed to ask the accused whether he understood the caution and if so, whether he wanted to make a statement. In recording the statement P.W.4 was exercising the powers under section 113 of the Criminal Procedure Code which is in pari materia with section 37A of the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance, 1952. The section renders such statement admissible at the trial of an accused person notwithstanding that it is recorded in the course of police investigation or that it is made wholly or partly in answer to questions or made to or in the hearing of any police officer of or above the rank of Inspector or whether or not it is interpreted to him by any other police officer or other person, provided the other requirements in sub-section (1)(a)(i) & (ii) are complied with. Sub-section (1)(a)(ii) refers to the administration of the caution which in this case, appeared to have been complied with. The other sub-section refers to the duty of the trial court to determine whether the making of the statement appears to have been caused by any inducement, threat or promise having reference to the charge from a person in authority, etc. (The emphasis is mine). From the words italicised, if it is the intention of legislature to safeguard the position of the recording police inspector who is also the investigating officer in so far as the voluntariness of the cautioned statement is concerned, then the discretion of the trial court in considering the proviso (a)(i) appeared to be narrowed. It has been and is still the accepted practice of the police and a salutary one, to require their officers other than the investigating officers, to record such statements from accused persons who are in their custody. A departure from such practice seldom happens and if it does, it is mainly due to urgency and non-availability of such officers on hand.

Section 113 must be distinguished from section 112. In the latter any person examined by a police investigating officer is legally bound to state the truth and answer all questions put to him by such officer except the answers that have a tendency to expose him to a criminal charge, penalty or forfeiture (whether or not a caution under section 113(1) has been administered to him). The statement so recorded is intended toassist the police in their investigations and form the basis for evidence to be adduced by the prosecution at the trial. Section 113, on the other hand, renders the cautioned statement admissible in evidence at the trial of the accused who may be