JUDGMENT

1. The accused/appellant was charged as follows:-

"TUDUHAN PERTAMA

Bahawa kamu pada 02.02.1996 jam lebih kurang pukul 9.35 pagi di Jalan Belian, Pending dalam Daerah Kuching dalam negeri Sarawak sebagai pemandu motokar nombor pendaftaran QKC 5555 telah menggunakan motokar tersebut di atas jalan raya dengan lesen kenderaan motor yang telah tamat tempoh kuatkuasanya pada 16.01.1996 dan dengan yang demikian kamu telah melakukan kesalahan dibawah Seksyen 23(1) Akta Pengangkutan Jalan 1987 dan boleh dihukum dibawah seksyen 23(1) Akta yang sama.

TUDUHAN KEDUA

Bahawa kamu pada 02.02.1996 jam lebih kurang pukul 9.35 pagi di Jalan Belian, Pending dalam Daerah Kuching dalam Negeri Sarawak sebagai pemandu motokar nombor pendaftaran QKC 5555 telah memandu motokar tersebut di atas jalan raya tanpa perlindungan insurans berkenaan dengan risiko pihak ketiga dan dengan yang demikian kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah Seksyen 90(1) Akta Pengangkutan Jalan 1987 dan boleh dihukum dibawah Seksyen 90(2) Akta yang sama." [2]

The appellant pleaded guilty to both charges in the lower court and he was convicted and sentenced to a fine of RM150 or in default 1 week imprisonment on each charge and he was disqualified from holding a driving licence for a period of 12 months. The accused paid the fines, and appealed against the order of the 12 months disqualification only.

2. The appellant is a Sales Representative dealing in tyres and rims with YHI Kuching Sdn. Bhd. On the day in question he sent his car to a garage for repair, and as he needed to use a car for his work he borrowed a car from the garage. While driving the borrowed car, he was stopped by the police who found that he was using the said vehicle on the road with a road tax which had expired and no valid insurance policy covering the said car.

3. In a separate application, the appellant made an application for a revision under Section 325 Criminal Procedure Code (hereinafter called the "CPC"), for the court to revise the order of conviction on the grounds that there was a breach of Section 173(a) and (b) of the CPC, in that it is not certain whether the appellant had understood the nature and consequences of his pleas; and that there were no brief facts of the case and it is uncertain whether the appellant had understood the facts to which he pleaded.

From the Appeal Record it is clear that the charges had been read and explained to the appellant in Hokkien, and he understood the charges before he entered his plea of guilty. The brief facts are as contained in the charges themselves, and in summons cases, it is not necessary that the brief facts be set out separately. The 3 cases cited by the appellant, LEE WENG TUCK & ANOR. V. P.P. (1989) 2 MLJ 143 (SC); ABDUL KADIR BIN ABD. RAHMAN V. P.P. (1984) MLJ 80; P.P. V. NAZARUDIN BIN AHMAD & ORS. (1993) 2 MLJ 9 are distinguishable in that they concern serious crimes, viz. an offence under Section 39B Dangerous Drug Act, Section 409 Penal Code and Section 304 Penal Code, in which [3] case details of the facts of the case showing the ingredients of offences committed need be clearly set out. It is important that the accused person admitted the facts before his plea of guilt is accepted by the court.

In the instant case, the brief facts are simply that the appellant drove a car on a public road without a road tax and insurance. To a layman, that is no too difficult to understand and appreciate. In my view this is not a case for revision as there is no irregularity in the proceedings in the court below. As the High Court power in revision is discretionary, it must be exercised judiciously within the limit and the spirit of the legislation. In LIAW KWAI WAH & ANOR. V. P.P. (1987) 2 MLJ 87 the Supreme Court had occasion to define "discretion" as meaning that "when it is said something is to be done within the discretion of the authorities that something to be done according to the rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion