1996 MarsdenLR 2108
COURT OF APPEAL KUALA LUMPUR
HARRIS SOLID STATE (M) SDN BHD & ORS – Appellant
Versus
BRUNO GENTIL PEREIRA & ORS – Respondent
[Civil Appeal No: W-04-109-95]
[1] We commenced hearing of this appeal on 22 May 1996 and continued listening to argument on 23 May. However, as V T Nathan of Counsel for the appellants was unable to complete his oral submissions on 23 May, we adjourned further hearing of the appeal to 12 August 1996.We also directed Counsel on both sides to put a written note of their argument to assist us. Counsel obliged. At the conclusion of the argument on 12 August we dismissed the appeal and made certain orders which we will set out in detail at the conclusion of this judgment.
[2] The brief facts of this case are as follows.
[3] The appellants are all subsidiaries of a common holding company, namely, Harris Corporation Inc which is a company incorporated in the United States of America ('Harris Inc'). For convenience we will call them "the Harris Group". In the proceedings before the Industrial Court, the first appellant was referred to as HSSM, the second appellant as HAT and the third appellant as HSM respectively. We will not follow suit. Instead, we will refer to them merely as 'the appellants' and in the order in which they appear in the title to the appeal.
[4] The respondents are twofold. The first to the twenty-first respondents were members of the in-house union in the first appellant, the first to the third respondents being office bearers of the union. The twenty-second respondent is the union. But it is not really concerned in the appeal. Accordingly, the expression 'the respondents' wherever appearing in this judgment refers only to the first to the twenty-first respondents.
[5] So much for the description of the parties in this appeal.
[6] Now, the first appellant was not always a part of the Harris Group. Prior to its acquisition by Harris Inc it was known as RCA Sdn Bhd We will refer to it as RCA or the first appellant, as the context requires. It changed its name after being acquired by Harris Inc on 8 November 1988.
[7] Mr Nathan took us through the rather tortuous path by which RCA became part of the Harris Group. He told us that this was important to the appeal. We do not agree. In fact we find much of the background outlined by him to be wholly irrelevant to the issues that call for ultimate decision. We will therefore omit the recitation of it here and confine ourselves only to the salient facts.
[8] At the time RCA became a part of the Harris Group, there were, at Ulu Kelang, Selangor, two other companies which were wholly owned subsidiaries of Harris Inc They are the second and third appellants before us. The third appellant manufactured computer chips for military use. The second appellant tested these chips for marketing purposes. RCA also produced computer chips. But it was for commercial and not military use.
[9] As at the date of the acquisition of RCA by Harris Inc, the former's workmen had not been unionised. It was only on 31 January 1989 that an in-house union was registered. By that date, Harris Inc had acquired RCA. On the very next day, RCA was informed of this.
[10] From the very start, the Harris Group - in truth Harris Inc - resented the formation of the trade union. It did not want a union on its premises. It laid all sorts of obstacles in the path of the union. The object was to frustrate the union.
[11] The union sought recognition from the first appellant on 23 June 1989. The Director-General of Industrial Relations, on 10 January 1990, advised that recognition be accorded. But the Harris Group declined to accord any recognition to the union. So the union had to resort to the statutory procedure. It applied to the Minister. Both sides put in their submissions and awaited the Minister's decision.
[12] Meanwhile, having received the Director-General's advice, the Harris Group must have realised that an order from the Minister directing recognition was inevitable. It therefore busied itself with the task of destroying the union.
[13] As a first step the second appellant purported to send out letters to individual