Abdul Malik Ishak J:

On 14 September 1996 the Senior Assistant Registrar ('SAR') agreed with the preliminary objection advanced by the plaintiff and struck out encl. 49 with liberty to file afresh. On the same date, the SAR refused to accede to the preliminary objection of the second defendant as they were not relevant then. Being aggrieved the second defendant filed an appeal to the Judge in chambers dated 16 September 1996 as reflected in encl. 54.

Enclosure 49 was an application by the second defendant to strike out the writ and the statement of claim of the plaintiff using cumulatively O. 18 r. 19(1)(a), (b), (c) and/or (d) of the Rules of the High Court 1980 ('RHC'). This provoked the displeasure of the plaintiff who then raised a preliminary objection to the following effect. That O. 18 r. 19(1)(a), (b), (c) and/or (d) of the RHC cannot be invoked cumulatively. That reliance under O. 18 r. 19(1)(a) of the RHC must necessarily mean that no evidence shall be admissible and the Court must consider only the pleadings for the purpose of determining whether the statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action. For ease of reference O. 18 r. 19 of the RHC is now reproduced hereinunder:

19(1) The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any pleading or the endorsement, of any writ in the action, or

anything in any pleading or in the endorsement, on the ground that:

(a) it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence, as the case may be; or

(b) it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious; or

(c) it may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action; or

(d) it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court.

and may order the action to be stayed or dismissed or judgment to be entered accordingly, as the case may be.

(2) No evidence shall be admissible on an application under para. (1)(a).

(3) This rule shall, so far as possible, apply to an originating summons and a petition as if the summons or petition, as the case may be, were a pleading.

The second defendant announced to the whole world at large, so to speak, in encl. 49 of their intention to use the affidavit of Chang Fok Chin that was affirmed on 30 May 1996 even though they sought to strike out the statement of claim as it disclosed no reasonable cause of action under O. 18 r. 19(1)(a) of the RHC. Can the second defendant do so? It is now settled law that where the only ground on which the application for striking out is made is pivoted on the point that the statement of claim discloses no reasonable cause of action, no evidence is admissible: Attorney-General of Duchy of Lancaster v. L. & N.W. Ry [1892] 3 Ch. 278; Republic of Peru v. Peruvian Guano Co. [1887] 36 Ch. D. 489, p. 498. It is interesting to note that Wenlock v. Moloney [1965] 1 WLR 1238; [1965] 2 All ER 871 CA lays down the now famous principle that where the only ground on which the statement of claim can be said to disclose no reasonable cause of action relates to the point that the action is unlikely to succeed, affidavit evidence is said to be equally inadmissible. My understanding of Wenlock v. Moloney (supra) when translated to the issue at hand is this: applications for striking out pleadings on grounds (b) or (c) or (d) of O. 18 r. 19(1) of the RHC or for that matter as stated in encl. 49 where the inherent jurisdiction of the Court is invoked, affidavit evidence may and will ordinarily be used. All the facts will be considered and the affidavits as to the facts of the whole case would also be admissible where the application is grounded on the inherent jurisdiction of the Court:Willis v. Earl Howe [1893] 2 Ch. pp. 551, 554; Vinson v. The Prior Fibres Consolidated Ltd. [1906] WN 209; Norman v. Matthews [1916] 85 LJ KB 857 and on appeal it was reported in [1916] WN 133; Remmington v. Scoles [1897] 2 Ch. 1.

The word 'or' appears between (a), (b), (c) and (d) of O. 18 r. 19(1) of the RHC and in ordinary usage the word 'or' is