1973 MarsdenLR 15
HIGH COURT (KUANTAN)
SYED OTHMAN, J
KANNAN
versus
MENTERI BURUH DAN TENAGA RAKYAT
ORIGINATING MOTION NO. 9 OF 1972
Decided On : 11-10-73
For the applicants - S Sivasubramaniam; S Sivasubramanian For the first respondent - Mokhtar bin Sidin (SFC)
Syed Othman J:
The first applicant is the president of the National Union of Plantation Workers (NUPW) of Sungei Talam Division. The second applicant is his wife. Both were rubber tappers under the employ of the second respondents (the employers) until 6 September 1971 when they were dismissed.
They seek an order of certiorari to remove into this Court and quash a decision dated 7 December 1971 made by the first respondent (the Minister) under s. 16A of the Industrial Relations Act, 1967 confirming the dismissal of the applicants by the employers.
The grounds on which the order is sought are in effect that the Minister acted in error of law and exceeded his jurisdiction in refusing to interfere with the decision of the employers, as there was insufficient evidence to support or justify the dismissal.
Paragraphs 3 to 9 of the applicants' affidavit, which are said to show the circumstances leading to the dismissal, read:
(3) Sometime in late August, 1971 the second respondent informed all the rubber tappers at Sg Talam Division that they had to go out in the afternoon again, after normal duty hours, to scrape the rubber trees and clean the latex cups without receiving any additional payment therefor.
(4) As President of the National Union of Plantation Workers Sg Talam Division, I, (the first applicant) instructed the other rubber tappers not to do the work as the subject matter was being negotiated between the National Union of Plantation Workers and the Malayan Agricultural Producers Association, the second respondents' Union.
(5) On or about 2 September 1971, the estate conductor, a servant of the second respondent, informed that if I (the first applicant) was not prepared to do the scraping the second respondent would not mind but requested me not to ask the other rubber tappers not to co-operate. I did not agree to this suggestion.
(6) On or about 4 September 1971 at about 1.00 p.m. the said estate conductor informed all the rubber tappers that they should go out again at 2.00 p.m. to scrape the rubber trees and clean the latex cups without receiving any additional payment therefor.
(7) The said estate conductor produced a letter purportedly from the National Union of Plantation Workers.
(8) I (the first applicant) examined this letter and found that it was not from the National Union of Plantation Workers. I asked the other rubber tappers not to carry out these additional duties till the National Union of Plantation Workers and Malayan Agricultural Producers Association had reached an agreement on the same.
(9) On 6 September 1971, I (the first applicant) was dismissed by the second respondent allegedly for 'misconduct' and I (the second applicant) under s. 17 Employment Ordinance, 1955".
The employment of the second applicant was terminated by operation of s. 17 of the Employment Ordinance, 1955 (No. 38 of 1955), which provides:
Where a contract of service between an employer and a labourer terminates, any contract of service between the employer and the husband or wife of the labourer shall also terminate unless the husband or wife within forty-eight hours of the termination of the labourer's contract of service notifies the employer that he or she desires that such contract of service shall continue in force.
The affidavit further deposes that on 13 November 1971 an enquiry was held under s. 16A of the Industrial Relations Act, 1967 (No. 35/1967) and the Minister "confirmed the dismissal" on 7 December 1971. On 14 April 1972 the applicants applied for a copy of the notes of enquiry. But the Ketua Penggarah
Hal Ehwal Perhubongan Perusahaan, Malaysia refused the application on the ground that the decision of the Minister under s. 16A of the Act is final and conclusive and cannot be challenged in any Court.
The employers have chosen to ignore the process of this Court. They have not extended to this Court the courtesy of appointing a representative at the hearing of the application, if not for anyth