Jeffrey Tan J:

[1] In the court below, the appellant pleaded guilty to the following 3 offences, all of rape of his daughter.

[2] First charge

Bahawa kamu pada Januari 1998 hingga Disember 1998 jam antara 2.30. petang hingga 11.30 malam bertempat di sebuah rumah di alamat No. 238, Lorong Sulaiman, Batu 2 3/4 Jalan Bakri di Daerah Muar di Negeri Johor, telah merogol anak perempuan kamu nama Malisa binti Mansor, KPT 851222-01-5378 yang berumur 13 tahun, dengan itu kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah Seksyen 376 Kanun Keseksaan dan boleh dihukum di bawah peruntukan yang sama.

[3] Second charge

Bahawa kamu pada Januari 2001 hingga Disember 2001 jam antara 2.30. petang hingga 11.30 malam bertempat di sebuah rumah di alamat No. 238, Lorong Sulaiman, Batu 2 3/4 Jalan Bakri di Daerah Muar di Negeri Johor, telah merogol anak perempuan kamu nama Malisa binti Mansor, KPT 851222-01-5378 yang berumur 16 tahun, dengan itu kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah Seksyen 376 Kanun Keseksaan dan boleh dihukum di bawah peruntukan yang sama.

[4] Third charge

Bahawa kamu pada 7 Januari 2003 jam lebih kurang 8.30 pagi antara 2.30. petang hingga 11.30 malam bertempat di sebuah rumah di alamat No. 238, Lorong Sulaiman, Batu 2 3/4 Jalan Bakri di Daerah Muar di Negeri Johor, telah merogol anak perempuan kamu nama Malisa binti Mansor, KPT 851222-01-5378 yang berumur 17 tahun 1 bulan, dengan itu kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah Seksyen 376 Kanun Keseksaan dan boleh dihukum di bawah peruntukan yang sama.

[5] This is the appellant's appeal against the sentences of 18 years imprisonment and 8 strokes of the cane for each offence, all to run consecutively, that the court below handed down on 4 March 2004.

[6] The appellant argued his own appeal. He pleaded for a concurrent sentence. He said he was 51 years old, had 2 wives, sons and 3 daughters. Nothing more was said by the appellant. The learned Deputy Public Prosecutor, Wirna bte Ripin, merely stressed that the admitted facts of the case revealed that the appellant had raped his daughter on 10 separate occasions. She asked for the sentences to be affirmed.

[7] On the matter of whether sentences should be ordered to run concurrently or consecutively, the Court of Appeal per Augustine Paul JCA, as he then was, in Bachik bin Abdul Rahman v. Public Prosecutor [2004] 2 CLJ 572, explained that the court would be guided by the one transaction rule and the totality principle:

The combined effect of s. 282 and s. 292 is that unless the court imposing a sentence says anything to the contrary, the sentence runs from the date on which it was passed (see Ooi Sim Yim v. Public Prosecutor [1990] 1 CLJ 223 (Rep); [1990] 1 CLJ 435; [1990] 1 MLJ 88). The exercise of the discretion to determine the date of commencement of the sentence of imprisonment is dependent on the facts and circumstances of each case. In deciding whether the terms of imprisonment should be consecutive or commence at another date the court will be guided by the one transaction rule and the totality principle. Pursuant to the one transaction rule where two or more offences are committed in the course of a single transaction all sentences in respect of these offences should be concurrent rather than consecutive (see R v. Saleem [1964] Crim LR 482; R v. Walsh [1965] Crim LR 248). For there to be one transaction four elements must be present, that is to say, proximity of time, proximity of place, continuity of action and continuity of purpose or design (see Jayaraman & Ors v. PP [1979] 2 MLJ 88; Amrita Lal Hazra v. Emperor 42 Cal 957; Chin Choy v. PP [1955] MLJ 236). The rule, however, is not absolute. As Yong Pung How CJ said in Kanagasuntharam v. PP [1992] 1 SLR 81 at p 83:

The English courts have recognised that there are situations where consecutive sentences are necessary to discourage the type of criminal conduct being punished: see R v. Faulkner [1972] 56 Cr App R 594, R v. Wheatley [1983] 5 Cr App R (S) 417 and R v. Skinner [198