Callow J:

This is an application for bail made in accordance with the provisions of s. 395 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

Mr. Salt appeared for the accused and was heard. Mr. Kilner, the Deputy Public Prosecutor, opposed the application.

In the first place I must guard against any expression likely to, or possible to be construed as, indicating my view of the case. Indeed it is to my disadvantage in considering this application that I know so little of the evidence which it is intended to adduce.

I am therefore of the opinion that I am not at liberty to consider whether the charge against the accused should be for the contravention of s. 395 or 161 of the Penal Code. Mr. Salt emphasised that the alleged facts supported a charge under the latter section, and thus the offence was one in which bail should be granted (vol. 1 Laws of the Straits Settlements p. 542). The learned Deputy Public Prosecutor had little information as to the nature of the prosecution evidence, and in any event I feel it would be improper and impossible for this Court to decide that the accused should be charged under s. 161 of the Penal Code, and in consequence bail should be granted.

There are set out in the 2nd Edn. of Mallal's Criminal Procedure Code at P. 377 nine points which the Court may take into consideration when granting or refusing bail; they are:

(1) Whether there was or was not reasonable ground for believing the accused guilty of the offence. (On this the Court was afforded no information. It could have been supplied by affidavit, R v. Rutchinson ILR 53 All at p. 938.

(2) The nature and gravity of the offence charged. (Clearly the alleged offence is grave).

(3) The severity and degree of punishment that might follow. (Extortion is receiving exemplary punishment; the maximum is three years imprisonment or fine or whipping, or any two of such punishments).

(4) The danger of the accused absconding if released on bail.

(5) His character, means and standing.

(6) The danger of the offence being continued or repeated.

(7) The danger of the witnesses being tampered with.

(8) Opportunity to the accused to prepare the defence.

(9) The long period of detention of the accused and probability of further period of delay. (Assuming the trial takes place on 23 as arranged, the period from arrest to trial will be ten days).

Of those points Mr. Salt relied on number 8, and the Deputy Public Prosecutor in opposing the application urged number 7.

Naturally the primary consideration is to ensure the presence of the accused to stand his trial, and bail should not be refused lightly. A man is innocent until found guilty, and failing strong grounds he should be granted bail.

Now there is no suggestion that free access to the accused in custody is denied. Mr. Sales argument seemed directed more to the inconvenience he himself experienced, than to any difficulty or embarrassment likely to result against the accused in the preparation of his defence.

On the other hand the learned Deputy Public Prosecutor spoke of the likelihood of interference with prosecution witnesses, and that is a strong reason. At p. 969 of Sohoni's Code of Criminal Procedure it states -

Any allegation that the accused is tampering or attempting to tamper with evidence would be a cogent ground for refusing bail.

Here the allegation made before and accepted by the learned District Judge is that there was good reason to expect interference with witnesses. I agree with Mr. Salt that it would have been better had the O.C.P.D. appeared in person and satisfied the Court of the allegation made but it is evident that the learned District Judge based his refusal to grant bail on the ground of interference with witnesses.

Now at p. 967 of Sohoni's Code of Criminal Procedure, 14th edition, it states:

.....it is well settled that the High Court will not lightly interfere with the exercise of discretion vested in the lower Court. Where the Sessions Judge refused bail after taki