Gopal Sri Ram JCA:

[1] We heard and dismissed this appeal on 22 January 1996. The reasons for our decision now follow.

[2] The short point that arises in this appeal is the applicability, to the facts of this case, of the summary jurisdiction conferred upon the Court by O 89 of the Rules of the High , 1980. Those facts, all of which are undisputed, are as follows.

[3] The respondent is the registered proprietor of a piece of land held under Certificate of Title No 9018 for Lot No 55, in the town and district of Kuala Lumpur, which we will, throughout this judgment, refer to as "the said land". It purchased the said land from a company called Metro Murni Sdn Bhd ("Metro Murni") under an agreement dated 23 January 1991. The transfer was registered in the respondent's favour on 21 October 1991. That registration conferred upon the respondent, by reason of the provisions of the National Land Code 1965 ("the Code"), a bundle of rights, including the right to immediate possession of the said land. Additionally, it was a term of the agreement of sale and purchase that the respondent shall have vacant possession of the said land.

[4] The said land was, at the time the respondent became its registered proprietor, indeed vacant. There was an old building on it. But it was unoccupied. The respondent wanted to construct a petrol station on the property but it was unable to obtain approval for this from the relevant authorities.

[5] The first time the respondent heard anything further about the said land was when the Kuala Lumpur City Hall issued an enforcement notice dated 12 February 1993 to the respondent, citing the latter for a breach of the Federal Territory (Planning) Act 1982. The gist of the complaint was that a building had been constructed upon the said land without any approval from City Hall.

[6] On receiving this notice the respondent caused inquiries to be made and was quite shocked by what it discovered. The gate that was meant to keep trespassers out of the property had been broken. The old building that had been on the land had been demolished. In its place were several other buildings which included an office and a showroom for cars. There were two signboards atop one of the buildings. One was that of the first appellant; the other of the second appellant. It was quite plain for all to see that the appellants were carrying on business on the said land. There is no doubt that they were doing so without the respondent's consent.

[7] The respondent lost no time in consulting solicitors who wrote to the appellants and all those in occupation of the said land asserting that they (the appellants) were trespassers and demanding that they vacate it. The appellants too consulted solicitors. There then followed some correspondence between the respondent's solicitors and those of the appellants. In a gist, the appellants denied that they were trespassers and alleged that the sale of the said land to the respondent had been aborted.

[8] The respondent then took out a summons under O 89 and claimed the summary relief made available by that Order. The appellants resisted the respondent's summons. The appellants' resisted the summons on the following facts which they led in evidence.

[9] In February 1993, the first appellant purchased all the shares of Metro Murni from the latter's previous shareholders. Thereafter, Metro Murni (in reality the first appellant), proceeded to terminate the sale to the respondent. Following the letter of termination, Metro Murni re-took possession of the said land from the respondent. It then let the appellants into the possession.

[10] The appellants accordingly, justify their occupation on the ground that they are upon the land with the consent of, or by licence of the respondent predecessor in title. This was the entire basis on which the case was argued before the High Court and before us.

[11] The learned Judge who heard the summons made an order for vacant possession against the appellants. We are enti