1987 MarsdenLR 2
SUPREME COURT (KUALA LUMPUR)
SALLEH ABAS, LP, WAN SULEIMAN, J, SEAH, J, HASHIM YEOP A SANI, J & SYED AGIL BARAKBAH, SCJJ
WAN JALIL BIN WAN ABDUL RAHMAN
versus
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
CRIMINAL APPEALS NOS 28 AND 29 OF 1986
Decided On : 12-16-87
Solicitors: Siva, Ram & Associates; Mura Raju & Co.
S Sivasubramanian for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No 28/86.
T Mura Raju for the first appellant in Criminal Appeal No 29/86.
Ramdas Tikamdas for the second appellant in Criminal Appeal No 29/86.
Mohamed Noor Haji Ahmad (Deputy Public Prosecutor); Zaini Haji Abdul Rahman (Deputy Public Prosecutor) with him for the respondent.
(delivering the grounds of decision of the court): The additional ground of appeal in Criminal Appeal Nos. 28 and 29 of 1986 seeks to show that a mandatory death sentence for the drug trafficking offence and for the offence under the Fire Arms (Increased Penalties) Act is against the injunctions of Islam and therefore void. It is argued that since Islam is the religion of the Federation (Article 3(1)), and since the Constitution is the supreme law of the Federation (Article 4(1)), the imposition of the death penalty on these offences, not being a "huddud" or "qisas" according to Islamic law, is contrary to Islamic injunction and is therefore unconstitutional.
The first point to consider here is the meaning which could be given to the expression "Islam" or "Islamic religion" in Article 3 of the Constitution. If the religion of Islam in the context means only such acts as relate to rituals and ceremonies, the argument has no basis whatsoever. On the other hand, if the religion of Islam or Islam itself is an all-embracing concept, as is normally understood, which consists not only the ritualistic aspect but also a comprehensive system of life, including its jurisprudence and moral standard, then the submission has a great implication in that every law has to be tested according to this yard-stick.
There can be no doubt that Islam is not just a mere collection of dogmas and rituals but it is a complete way of life covering all fields of human activities, may they be private or public, legal, political, economic, social, cultural, moral or judicial. This way of ordering the life with all the precepts and moral standards is based on divine guidance through his prophets and the last of such guidance is the Quran and the last messenger is Mohammad S.A.W. whose conduct and utterances are revered. (See S. Abdul A'la Maududi, The Islamic Law and Constitution, 7th Ed., March 1980.)
The question here is this: Was this the meaning intended by the framers of the Constitution? For this purpose, it is necessary to trace the history of Islam in this country after the British intervention in the affairs of the Malay States at the close of the last century.
Before the British came to Malaya, which was then known as Tanah Melayu, the sultans in each of their respective states were the heads not only of the religion of Islam but also as the political leaders in their states, which were Islamic in the true sense of the word, because, not only were they themselves Muslims, their subjects were also Muslims and the law applicable in the states was Muslim law. Under such law, the sultan was regarded as God's vicegerent (representative) on earth. He was entrusted with the power to run the country in accordance with the law ordained by Islam, i.e. Islamic law and to see that law was enforced. When the British came, however, through a series of treaties with the sultans beginning with the Treaty of Pangkor and through the so-called British advice, the religion of Islam became separated into two separate aspects, viz. the public aspect and the private aspect. The development of the public aspect of Islam had left the religion as a mere adjunct to the ruler's power and sovereignty. The ruler ceased to be regarded as God's vicegerent on earth but regarded as a sovereign within his territory. The concept of sovereignty ascribed to humans is alien to Islamic religion because in Islam, sovereignty belongs to God alone. By ascribing sovereignty to the ruler, i.e. to a human, the divine source of legal validity is severed and thus the British turned the system into a secular institution. Thus all laws including administration of Islamic laws had to receive this validity through a secular fiat. Although theoretically because the sovereignty of the ruler was absolute in the sense that he could do what he likes, and govern according to what he thought fit, the Anglo/Malay Treaties restricted this power. The effect of the restriction made it possible fo