1976 MarsdenLR 245
Suffian LP:
Akil bin Lebai Mat died on 20 October 1956, leaving two widows and several children by each widow. Aishah binti Man the first widow is not of sound mind, and her two daughters (the two plaintiffs) are her committee. Sharifah binti Haji Ahmad the first defendant is the second widow.
Akil died owning share in a piece of land.
After Akil's death an application was made to the Settlement Officer, Pendang, Kedah, for distribution of Akil's estate to his beneficiaries according to Muslim law. The application was made under the Small Estates (Distribution) OrdinanceNo. 34 of 1955. According to the Settlement Officer's record, all present agreed to the estate being distributed according to Muslim law and accordingly on 15 June 1966, the Settlement Officer made an order under the Ordinance by which he awarded 128/2048 share in the land to Aishah the first widow as her share.
The plaintiffs have brought this suit against the first defendant and eight other relatives, seeking to set aside the Settlement Officer's order. They allege that before the date of the order Aishah had been of unsound mind for 30 years; that at the time of the order she was of unsound mind; that her consent to the distribution order was not valid; that she should have been awarded half her husband's interest in the land as sharikat property (acquired by the joint efforts of herself and her late husband); that on 10 November 1966, a few months after the order she was admitted to the General Hospital, Penang, where she was declared to suffer from pre-senile dementia very likely due to cerebral arteriocleris and that she was incapable of managing her own affairs; wherefore the plaintiffs pray for an order that the Settlement Officer's order be set aside or varied or rectified and for a declaration that half Akil's interest in the land be transferred to Aishah as sharikat property.
On 18 February 1975, when the case came up for hearing, Mr. RC Murugesan for the first, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh defendants raised a preliminary objection. He argued that-
(1) the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiffs' claim to set aside the distribution order and
(2) the statement of claim disclosed no cause of action.
The learned judge held that he had jurisdiction, particularly if the plaintiffs' claim was based on fraud. But he decided to dismiss the plaintiffs' claim without hearing the evidence, holding that from the record of the proceedings before the Settlement Officer not only was Aishah present, her daughters (the two plaintiffs) were also present; that if Aishah had been of unsound mind for thirty years previously (as alleged in the pleadings), then surely her daughters must have known about it and yet none of them informed the Settlement Officer, and in view of this it cannot be said that there had been fraud and therefore there was no cause of action.
The plaintiffs have appealed to us.
Mr Jayadeva argued on their behalf that the High Court has jurisdiction, as the learned judge has held, and that having so held the learned judge should have heard the evidence and counsel's submissions on the law, and that only then should the learned judge have dismissed the plaintiffs' claim if he saw fit, and that in the circumstances of this case the Federal Court should allow the appeal and order the lower Court to hear the evidence and consider submissions, and then, and only then decide on the case.
Mr. Murugesan repeats before us his contention that the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this suit.
The issue in this case is whether or not the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain this suit.
With all due respect to Mr. Jayadeva, I do not agree that the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain this suit.
The suit is an attempt to get an order whereby an interest in Akil's estate should devolve on or vest in his beneficiaries. Normally the High Court would have jurisdiction to entertain it. But this suit